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PREFACE:  CONDITIONS IN FORMER  YUGOSLAVIA
L. Reconstruction in  former Yugoslavia concerns two  countries in  particular:
Bosnia-Herzegovina  and, to a lesser extent, Croatia.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
The institutions  created by Dayton in Bosnia-Herzegouina
2. .The _peace agreement divided  Bosnia into two entities, each with a large measure of
independence' namely, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,  with a population  of Muslims and
Croats, and Republika  Srpska, where the population is made up of Serbs. Ten cantons were
established within the Federation, forrning an intermediate level of government between the
entify and the rnunicipality.
3- As Bosnia was not an independent State before the war new institutions  had to be
established at all levels of the State, the entities and the cantons. The fragility of the institutions
that were emerging in Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the tensions  between representatives  of the ethnic
communities within the State and Federation authorities and the dispersal of responsibility
among the State, entity, cantonal and municipal  governments  made it particularly difficult for
providers of funds (including the European  Commission)  to find responsible partners for
operations  in the country  during the period 1,996-g7.
Economic situation
4. The cost of imrnediate war damage in Bosnia was estimated at between 15 1t50 and 30 300
Mio ECU (1). The country's infrastructure was in poor condition before the war and has
deteriorated further since then, owing to lack of maintenance.  Industrial production in 1995
was not more than 10 T" of the pre-war level, and the economy  was in need of radical reform.
At the end of 1995 80 T" of the population  was dependent on humanitarian  aid.
5. At the end of 1997 the situation in Bosnia was still giving cause for concern. GDp, which in
1996 tose by 50 o/", rcaching 554 ECU/head of population, increased by a further 35 "/, jn
1997, but was still extremely low(2). Industrial  production  was still only 20% of the pre-war
level (3). As of the same date some 20 % of the population  continued to rely on food aid and
health care remained  dependent on international  aid (a).
Situation of refugees and displaced persons
6. ..Out of a_pre-war population of four million inhabitants 250 000 people were killed and one
rnillion displaced within the country, whilst a further 1,3 millio" n.a to other countries.
Generally  speaking, the refugees  originated in towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas the
displaced persons  were people who left their villages during the war in search of relative safety
!n the towns, in many cases occupying  houses that had been abandoned  when the inhabitants
fled abroad. In order to enable the refugees to return, it was first necessary to help the displaced
persons  reoccupy their own homes in war-torn afeas.
(1) Source:  ITorld Bank: Priority reconstruction programme, Novembet L996,, Volume  3.
(2) See Table A at the end of this preface.
(3) source: Economist Intelligence  unit country Report, first quarter r99g.
(a) Source: European  Community  Humanitarian  Oflice.31,.7.98 TEN I Official Journal of the European  Communities c 241,15
7, At the end of 1,997 800 000 people were still displaced within Bosnia-Herzegovina,  whilst
only 200 000 refugees had returned;  61,2 000 refugees were still abroad, 263 000 of them in EU
Mernber Srates, including 220 000 in Germany, without any lasting solution having been
found (t) (t).
Croatia
8. The reconstruction  programme in Croatia centred on eastern Slavonia, the region which
suffered the mosr *"i-d"-"g.  and was under UNTAES (?) control during the period
1,996-1,997. The cost of immediate war damage in the area was estimated to be around  1 000
Mio ECU. The reintegration of this region into the Republic of Croatia requires that the Croats
be allowed  to return i., p.".., but the rights of the Serb population  rnust also be protected' This
has been a serious constraint on the reconstruction process (see Table A).
The context of Community action
g. The Court of Auditors wishes to point out the nature of the conditions  under which the
reconstruction operations were undertaken, as their subsequent implementation  was seriously
affected by local conditions. The salient features were:
a) the need for urgenr action, arising from the political situation and the need for
reconstruction work to start at the beginning of 1996;
b) the politically unstable situation within the country, with sorne parties obstructing
implementation of the peace settlement;
c) the difficulty of obtaining  the agreement of government authorities in the different  entities
(required under Community  rules) led to delays in carrying out the various measures;
d) complex, and relatively inflexible, legal and financial instruments that required  the
simultaneous  application of two regulati,ons and several budget items. The Council adopted
the reconstruction Regulation (1,628196),  after consultation  of the European Parliament, at
the end of July 1,996. The tendering procedures and thresholds  that had been used for the
TACIS progrr*-e  were transposeJin this Regulation, but were unsuitable for the unusual
circumstances prevailing in former Yugoslavia. In response  to various criticisms concerning
aid to former Yugorluula the Council  adopted Regulation (EC) No 851198 (8) o.t 20 April
1998, after consu-iting the European Parliament. In the main, this Regulation follows the
Commission's  proposals for  making procedures  rnore flexible and speeding up
implementation.
(s) Source: UNHCR 'Repatriation  and Return Programme 1998'.
(5) Some  700 000 refugees have found durable solutions outside Bosnia-Herzegovina.
(?) UNTAES = United Nations Temporary Administration  in Eastern Slavonia.
(8) oJ L 1.22,24.4.1998, p. l.i
I
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Slovenia (1)
(ree6)
Croatia
(19es)
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Serbia-
Montenegro
(19es)
Ex-Rep. of
Macedonia
(lees)
Federation
11996)
Republika
Srpska
11996\
Area (km2
No. inhabitants (mio)
% of cultivated land
GNP (10e USD)
GNP/inhabitant  (USD)
Gross external debt
(10e usD)
20 300
2r0
1.2
1'6,3
r52
2,85
8
s6 538
415
26
t4,6
3 2s0
2,86
26 537
214
28
LtJ
864
(')
25 053
L14
0,5
392,0
/2)
87 968
10,8
35
919
920
25 71,3
211
22
118
860
Distribution of GNP by
sector (in %)
Agriculture
Extractive industries
Industry
Services
414
lrL
34,4
60.1
14,0
3r0
48,0
35,0
I 
13,5
| 
20,7
55,8
I 
17,9
l"
50,2
15,0
5r0
45,0
35,0
16,0
5r0
50,0
29,0
Unemployment  rate (7o)
Inflation  rarc e/o\
713
917
17,0
211
33,0
10,8
39,0
16,0
TABLE A
Economic data regarding  the republics of former  Yugoslavia
(t)  By I'irtue of irs special  situation  Slovenia  participates fullv in the PHARE programme and does not receive  any aid
under  the reconstruction programmes  for former Yugoslavia.
(2) The srate of Bosnia-Herzegovina's  external debt is esrimated  at 3,38 x t0e USD.
Sources: ATLASECO  1998;  The Economist Intelligence  Unit.
1. INTRODUCTION
1..1,. Following  the conclusion of the Dayton-Paris peace
settlement  at the end of 1.995 (e), the European Union
(EU) allocated an overall indicative amount of 1 000 Mio
(t) The decision  on ECHO aid is taken
planning.
ECU for postwar reconstruction  in former Yugoslavia
over the period 1996-1999 (0)  (see Table 1). This
amount essentially comprises the EU's contribution to the
5 100 Mio USD (3 880 Mio ECU) priority reconsrruction
programme for Bosnia-Herzegovina  that was adopted by
the international  community  at the end of  1995 (11\.
TABLE 1
Budgetary sources of aid for reconstruction in former  Yugoslavia (1996-7999)
annually in the course of the budget procedure. It is not sublect  to multiannual
(Mio ECU)
:rj  -  I  1-  :r,;  i=  .,1  -
, ;;;r  '
PHARE programme (DG IA)
Specific headings (DG IA)
Emergency aid (ECHO)
400
400
p.m.(1)
200
nil
600
400
p.m.
(e) The General Framework Agreement  for Peace in Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  was initialled  ar Dayton on 2l November 1995
and signed at Paris on 14 December  1995.
(10)Communication  from the Commission  on The European
Union's financial contribution  to reconstruction  in former
Yugoslavia, COM(95) 581 final, 18 December 1995.
(ll)The World Bank set our the programme  in the documenr
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Priorities for  Recovery  and
Growth'  prepared for rhe first donors' meeting held in
Brussels  in December  1995. The programme was seen as the
first phase of the reconstruction process.I
I
,t.
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Annex .1 contains a  breakdown of  the budgetary
appropriations for the EU and describes  the allocation of
responsibilities arnong the Commission  departments
concerned.
1,.2. In its 1996 annual report the Court of Auditors
pointed out that the progress of the reconstruction
programme  was very slow. In view of this alarrning
situation (12) the Court undertook a review of  the
Analysis of Commission aid for reconsffuction
the 1996 and 7997 budgets,  situation at 31
situation and the present
The Court briefed the
throughout  the inquiry.
report is the result of that work.
Commission on its findings
1.3. Table 2 shows
principal recipient of
period.
that Bosnia-Herzegovina  was the
reconstruction  aid over the 1'996-98
TABLE  2
and economic reform in former Yugoslavia financed from
December 1997 (including  emergency reconstruction aid)
(Mio ECU)
Reconstruction
Bosnia
Croatia
Serbia-Nlontenegro
FYROM
522,9
19,3
0r0
0r0
273,9
t2,7
0r0
1.99,5
816
0r0
0ro
:i:ti;i:i
: ai;ii: i
: i:tii:ii
iii  ii::lj i*#,i i
Economic  reform
Bosnia
Croatia
Serbia-Montenegro
FYROM
12,0
0r0
0r0
58,0
5S
"t"
0r0
0,0
715
0r8
0ro
0,0
lrl
;. ;,,,...  1.1;.,,,1 a;o
Source: Court of Auditors
1..4. The obiectives of the Court's audit were to evaluate
the Commission's management  of reconstruction  aid in
Bosnia-Herzegovina  and Croatia and to  assess  the
concrete effects of that aid at the end of 1997, i- e.
midway through the 1'996-99 programme  (13). Four
on-the-spot audits were carried out in "l'997 and two
visits were made at the end of 1'996 to the Member
(i2) Annual repofi concerning the financial year 1'996, OJ C 348'
1,8.1,1,.1997,  paragraphs  14.26 - 
14.3L.
(13)The  operating  costs of the Office of the United Narions High
Representative (OHR) were financed  to the extent of 10 Mio
ECU in  1995 and 4,6 Mio ECU in  1'997 using CFSP
appropriations (88-013). They were not audited  because they
lie outside the reconstruction  operations  framework. It  is
expected rhat they will be audited in the near future.
State-based  procurement agencies responsible for the
Bosnian supply programme  (14)' The visits were
supplemented by detailed review of the accounts and files
at the Commission's  headquarters  in Brussels.
2. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL  OBSERVATIONS
2.1.. The reconstruction
was started as a matter
programme  for ex-Yugoslavia
of urgency at the end of 1995.
(1a) Essential aid programme (EAP).ri
I
t
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Two years later, almost all action taken concerned  the
Croat-Muslirn  Federation of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  (see
paragraph 1.3 and paragraph 2 of the preface)  and the
rate of implementation was low (see paragraph 3.30).
2.2. Despite the fact that it  had outlined a  very
ambitious strategy in  four  Communications (see
paragraph 3.1) and clear guidelines existed (see
paragraph 3.11), the Commission subsequently  omitted
to  draw up  a  practical sectoral irnplementation
programme,  which would have rnade it possible to carry
out that strategy in a coordinated manner (see paragraph
3.3), especially as regards ECHO aid. Such a programme
would have been particularly useful in coordinating  the
measures on which refugee  return relies.
2.3. The Commission  concluded contracts with two
procurement  agencies under a programrne  for the supply
of 125 Mio ECU of equipmenr to Bosnia-Herzegovrna,
but without adequate  preparation,  and was obliged to
suspend the programrne  because it had over-estimated the
beneficiary  administrations' management capabilities (see
paragraph  3.5).
2.4. Commission action was directed towards a large
number of activity sectors (see paragraphs 3.4 - 
3.6),
but the Commission did not equip itself with the
resources  needed to fulfil its aspirations  and did not
redeploy to its operational  units, either in Brussels or
locally, the human resources that were needed for the
multitude of measures to be carried out properly  (see
paragraphs 3.13  3.25). Furthermore, the units in
question did not adequately  review their procedures  to
take account  of the need for speed, which slowed down
both the decision-taking process and the rate at which
measures were implemented  (see paragraphs  3.28
3.37, 3.41, 3.46 - 
3.50).
2.5. As a result of the coexistence  of three separate
regulations  governing  the budget articles used to finance
the reconstruction measures, similar operations were
subject to different rules and the European Union's
management  procedures  were  correspondingly
complicated  (see paragraphs  3.35 - 
3.37).
2.6. Use of the UNHCR to implement  housing repair
projects added a costly link to the chain of command,
without adding any additional technical skills (see
paragraph 3.55). Moreover,  the cooperation procedures
which the Commission  sought to impose on the UNHCR
were incompatible  with the global merhod of funding
which the latter employs on its own programmes  (see
paragraph  5.7). Finally, the Commission  was not able to
exercise the level of supervision of UNHCR operations
that it would have wished and on several occasions was
presented with a fait accompli when opc:rations were
abandoned  or cut (see paragraph 4.13).
2.7. Even though land-mines  continue to  claim a
considerable  number of victims, as well as delaying the
reconstruction programme, the amount of funds devoted
by the Commission to mine clearance  mea.sures is very
small and use of the funds has been particul:rrly  slow (see
paragraph 3.32). Furthermore,  the  appropriations
earmarked for this activiw in 1997 w€r€ rlcrt used.
2.8. Housing reconstruction encountered many obstacles
when proiects were not thought through carefully at the
beginning  and the number of households that rerurned to
their homes was much lower than expected (see
paragraph 4.13). On a number of occasions housing  was
renovated, but remained unoccupied, either because  the
work was interrupted or because security and living
conditions (including employment prospects) were
impossible (see paragraph 4.18). The number of homes
repaired is insufficient, which delays the return of
displaced people to their homes and also slows down
refugees' return, even though the latter is one of the
European Union's main objectives (see paragraphs  3.8
and 4.8 and Annex  3).
2.9. In general the renewal of infrastructure  in the
health and education  sectors has had a visible impact.
Institutional reforms are still necessary in both these
sectors, in order to ensure that services continue to
function (see paragraphs  4.22 and 4.26).
2.1,0. As of end-1997 energy-sector projects had still had
little impact (see paragraphs 4.29  4.30). The
Comrnission did not ensure thar the equipment supplied
under the EAP was installed (see paragraph 4.28) and the
other projects had still nor started, because of delays in
preparing calls for tenders  (see paragraph 4.30).
2.1,1,. Substantial  sums were committed in the ffansporr
sector, although there was only an indirect link between
these measures and the question of refugee return (see
paragraph 4.33). However, the visibility of the aid
earmarked for the reopening of public transport services
in Sarajevo  served to demonstrate  the EU presence (see
paragraph 4.34).
2.12. Although agriculture is an important source of
employment, Commission support for this sector has
remained relatively modest  (see paragruph  4.49). SorneI
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significant  measures were undertaken  in the areas of Una
Sana and Banja Luka, but only after mid-1997  (see
paragraphs 4.52 and 4.53). Commission support for the
industrial  sector was similarly limited (see paragraphs
4.s4 - 
4.s6).
2.1,3. Apart from setting up a Customs and fiscal
assistance office (CAFAO)  (see paragraph  4.58), which is
manifestly  efficient and effective, the Commission  did not
attach sufficient importance to the reform of public
administration,  despite the enormous institutional  needs
of Bosnia-Herzegovina  (see pangraph 3.7).
3. DESIGN AND  IMPLEMENTATION OF  AID
PROGRAMMES
Commission  strategy
3.1,. In  parallel with the Dayton agreement, the
Commission outlined its strategy for reconstruction  in
forrner  Yugoslavia in  four  complementary
Communications at the end of 1995 (15).
Planning of DG IA measures
3.2. Regulation (EC) No 1,628196 (5) laid down the
following objectives for the reconstruction  programme:
'to undeipin the reconstruction process' to encourage the
return of refugees, reconciliation  and regional economic
cooperation, and to create the economic and social
.ottditionr that will  lry  the foundations for  the
development  of the recipient countries'. These objectives
reiteraie those of the Communication mentioned in
footnote (15) (a).
3.3. The Commission  did not adopt a practical sectoral
implementation programme for carrying out its strategy'
It  ought to  have evaluated its own strengths and
weaknesses, as well as those of other donors, in order to
identify the sectors in which it could make the greatest
contribution  and should  have prepared its programme  on
that  basis, within the  coordinated international
framework provided for  in  the  Communication
mentioned in footnote (16) (d). In that Communication
(15) (a) SEC(95)  1597 final, 27.9'1,995;
(b) COM(95) 564 final, 17.1't.1995;
(c) COM(95) 581 final, 18'12.1'995;
(d) COM(95) 582 final, 20-1L.1'995.
(15)Council Regulation (EC) No L628196 of 25 July 1995,
oJ L 204, t8.1,8.1996.
the Comrnission stated that coordination  was to ensure
'the use of expertise and know-how specific to the
various fund donors'. It  did not even draw up a
coordinated internal implementation programme,  and the
approaches adopted by DG IA and ECHO have not
always been complementary.
3.4. As  Annexes 2.1  and 2.2  demonstrate,  the
Cornrnission selected large spheres of intervention that
enabled it  to respond to all sorts of demands, but
ultimately  resulted in a dissipation  of effort, which it was
unable to control because it had not mobilised sufficient
hurnan resources.
3.5. In L996, priority was given to a 125 Mio ECU
Essential Aid Programme (EAP) which was to provide
emergency  supplies in order to restart the economy of
Bosnia-Herzegovina by meeting priority needs in nine
sectors (17). The Commission  undertook this operation
even though it  had only limited experience  of
reconstruction-related  supply programmes' It  thus
supplied medical and educational equipment without
taking into account ECHO's activities in the same areas.
\(ith regard to the EAP (Supply), the Commission  relied
extensively  on the local authorities to identify needs and
distribute goods. Its over-estimation of the managerial
capabilities of the authorities  in  Bosnia-Herzegovrna
miant that it did not provide the necessary level of
technical support and supervision. Implementation
problems thus resulted in the Commission's suspending
ih. nRp in November  1.996, after it had committed  83
Mio ECU. The balance of 42 Mio ECU was used fot a
programme of aid that was mobilised through projects of
the conventional  type, whereby the Commission retains
responsibility for the works up until the final hand-over,
which was not the case with the supply programmes.
3.6. DG IA's 1.997 programme
which between them covered
namelv:
comprised three areas
virtually every sector,
a) private-sector development  and institution-building;
(l?)This programme was in response to the World Bank's
."q,r.tt for an inirial wave of financing estimated at 360 Mio
ECU and concerning 10 sectors of activity (COM (95) 3507
of  1.4.12.1.995).  The EU mine-clearance operations were
financed separately from the EAP (see paragraph 3.32l'{
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b) social-sector support (refugees, housing,  health and
education);
c) infrastructure (energy, transport, telecommunications
and water supply).
3.7. Over the period 1996-97 the Commission did not
play a significant  role in the area of economic reform and
institution-building  (see paragraphs 4.54 and 4.57),
especially in the health and education secrors, where
needs were particularly acute (see paragraphs 4.22 and
4.26\.
3.8. Given the importance that the EU Member States
place on refugees' return the Commission should have
made this issue one of its priorities  when it first became
involved, in 1996.lt would also have been more logical,
given that the two other main providers of funds (USAID
and the $7orld Bank) offer only limited aid to the
housing  sector. The Commission  is free to determine  the
remits of its own departrnents and should have made
ECHO, rather than DG IA, responsible  for the question
of refugees' return, on the grounds of the experience
gained by ECHO in the social sector during the war
years. In fact, ECHO is not only the principal  partner of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR),  who, in turn, is responsible for coordinating
refugee  aid (18), but the NGOs with which ECHO
concluded partnership  agreements usually also have
responsibility  for  implementing  refugee-aid projects.
Moreover, the humanitarian aid procedures allow ECHO
to handle urgent rehabilitation measures more rapidly
than DGIA (see paragraph 3.31), especially  as regards
the agreement of the local authorities, tendering and the
level of advances to partners  (up to 80 "/" of the total for
the operations  in question).
3.9. I7ith regard to infrastructure projects, the European
Union differs from other donors in that its procedures are
not fast enough and it  does not have the expertise
required if  it  is to achieve a  real impact within a
reasonable space of time.
Planning of ECHO
operations, ECHO does not (see Table 1) and whereas
conventional humanitarian aid can be adapted to an
annual  appropriations framework, rrehabilitation
assistance  requires a longer-term outlook. In  reality,
ECHO is not even in a position to draw up annual
estimates and the initial budget for article ts7-214 was
not enough to cover the whole of 1,997 (:see Annex 1
paragraph 3). 
'u7hereas 
there were substantial  calls on the
contingency  reserve in chapter B7-9 1,0 of the budget in
1,996, in 1997 additional  funds were taken from the
PHARE programme during the second half of  the
financial year (1e).
3.1,1. Despite the intentions which the Commission
published in its Cornmunication  to the Council and the
European Parliament on linking relief, rehabilitation and
development  (20), DG IA and ECHO did not adopt any
joint arrangements  for the gradual disengagement of the
Humanitarian Office during the  1996-99 period.
Similarly the task force comprising  staff responsible  for
hurnanitarian aid and staff from development  aid
departments,  which should have coordinated  the
transition, was not responsible for drau'ing up aid
programmes.
3.12. In 1996 ECHO focused its activities on basic
social infrastructure (particularly schools and health
facilities) as well as water and electncity supply
infrastructure,  but its involvement in the housing sector
was limited. The projects proposed by the NGOs were
appraised, but there were no criteria to ensure that
selection was systematic  and transparent. ECHO, on the
other hand, adopted an intersectoral approach and a set
of coherent criteria for the 1997 projects, which should
improve the impact of  the aid from this source,
particularly in the housing sector, where its involvement
has increased.
Organisation of DG IA departments
3.13. DG IA's inability to redeploy the human resources
needed for the reconstruction  operations was the main
stumbling block in the programme of aid for former
Yugoslavia.  The sum of 1 000 Mio ECU was approved  at
political level without a  proper assessment of  the
Commission's  managerial  capacity having been carried
out beforehand. The Commission  had already pointed
(1e)See  Special Report No 2/97 concerning  humanitarian
from the European  Union between '1,992 and "1.995,
C 1.43, I2.5.1997, paragraphs  2.14 to 2.L6.
(20)COM(96)  153 final, 30.4.1995.
3.10. Even though DG IA
framework which allows
has a multiannual financial
it to plan its rehabilitation
aid
oJ
(18)Under the Dayton-Paris accord (Annex 5).31.7.98 t ENI Official Journal of the European  Communities c 241,1L1,
out that its departments  did not have sufficient  staff, in
its 'Cornmunication on the reconstruction in former
Yugoslavia: EU aid administration  and international  aid
coordination',  and stated that it would take the necessary
corrective  measures  (see footnote (15)(d)).
3.1,4. Despite this declaration of  intent and the
programme's  financial and political importance, both the
development  of sectoral guidelines  and the managernent
and on-the-spot monitoring of projects in 1'997 were in
the hands of just five task managers in Brussels,  none of
whom were permanent rnernbers of the Commission's
staff, and most of whose contracts  end in mid-l998. The
Commission Delegation in Sarajevo  was also short of
staff for monitoring the reconstruction  programme,  to
which it assigned  only two auxiliary staff supervised by
the Head of  Delegation and his  assistant. The
Commission  did not open an Office in Croatia until April
L997. In September  1997 the Office still had only one
special envoy, assisted by local staff (21). In Bosnia and
Croatia the Commission  has not used local staff to
monitor programmes, unlike other donors, although it
does do this in its Delegations in PHARE countries.
3.15. A useful comparison  is Poland, which has an
annual funding allocation comparable  to that of Bosnia.
The Warsaw Delegation has 18 category A staff, 10 of
whom are local.
3.1,6. ln 1,996 the financing of the Commission's office
in  Sarajevo was largely improvised. A  substantial
proportion of the Office's running costs were met
through the EAP: personnel (463 582 ECU), equipment
(282 000 ECU) and operating costs (157 000 ECU)'
whereas such expenditure  should have been financed
from Part A  (administrative expenditure) ol  the
Commission's  budget (22). These operating costs were
covered out of the cash advances that the Commission
paid to the procurement agencies  that were responsible
for implementing  the programme.  As well as lacking
transparency,  this  irregular procedure made the
Commission Office unduly dependent on the agencies
that it was also responsible for supervising.  Furthermore,
(2t) A.r assistant, a secretary and a driver'
(22)See the Annual Report concerning the financial year 1,996,
paragraphs  "14.29 to 1'4.31, OJ C 348, 18-1'1"1997'
the Comrnission  had to pay agency fees of 5 000 ECU to
the agencies for straightforward  transfers of funds.
3.L7. Similarly, in  eastern Slavonia, DG IA  used
unorthodox procedures to  finance its administrative
expenditure. In this instance it used an NGO, supervised
by an expert on contract, as a screen to employ 27
people in Vukovar to draw up and implement  its
reconstruction programme  (23). The Commission  kept its
Vukovar 'branch' open without any changes, even after
the Zagreb Representative's Office opened in April 1,997.
Even though this is better than nothing as a way of
mobilising aid, it is unacceptable for the European Union
to use such arrangements when it is working with other
donors and the United Nations mission  (UNTAES) in the
region and is the largest donor in eastern Slavonia.
3.18. The shortage of  staff at  the  Commission
Delegation in Sarajevo and its limited decision-making
powers have reduced the scope for local coordination
with other donors. For example,  the OHR in Bosnia (24)
has set up a system of sectoral task forces comprising
representatives of  the various donors, in  order to
encourage  coordination, but the Cornmission does not
chair any of these task forces and is unable to make any
significant contribution to them, because of its lack of
on-the-spot resources.
3.I9. Management  of the programme in Bosnia has
rernained highly centralised' even though PHARE
programme management is substantially decentralised
and Regulation  (EC) No  1628196 (zs) provides that
Commission assistance shall, as far as possible, be
granted on a decentralised basis (26). Notwithstanding
this requirement the role of the Cornmission  Delegation
in Sarajevo has remained marginal, through being often
ill-defined.
3.20. Nfhile the difficulties encountered by the EAP
(Supply)  partly account for the Commission's  centralised
approactr-  (see paragraph  3.5), this centralisation  has itself
caused problems, not only during the negotiation of
financing agreements with  the  authorities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also when the content of the
projects was being determined.  In other central and
eastern European  countries the Commission  has set up a
(23)Many of these people, as well as the expert' were former
members of the team set up by the European Union to
administer the town of Mostar between  1994 and 1996.
(2a)The Office of the High Representative was set up under the
Dayton Agreement to oversee civilian  aspects of the peace
agreement  (see paragraph 1..4, note 13).
(25)Article 5.
(26)With  the exception of the supplies EAP, namely  83 Mio
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system of programme management units (PMUs)  to
mobilise its PHARE  aid. Under this system, which was
introduced in the light of the recommendations  made by
the Court in  its  Special report concerning the
decentralised system for the implementation of  the
PHARE programme  (27), the number of PMUs is limited
and financial management for  the programme is
centralised in one of them. In Bosnia such a system
would  have provided a  compromise between
decentralisation  and the over-centralisation  that was
adopted there. PMUs are set up in the ministries of
beneficiary countries and are staffed by both national
civil servants and foreign consultants, the latter being
financed under the PHARE prograrnme. The PMUs  are
supervised by the local Commission  Delegation.  This
system provides an important interface between the
Commission and the ministries  and facilitates  dialogue on
aid implementation.
3,21,. In Bosnia the rWorld Bank has set up strucrures
comparable  to the PMUs in the various ministries of the
two entities to manage the international aid which it
coordinates. The Commission  has rnade little use of such
structures.  At the end of 1997 the World Bank indicated
that it would very soon have disbursed  the bulk of the
funds that it intends to devote to reconstruction.  The
Commission  should take over the lead role by providing
technical assistance  to  these structures, in order to
support the institution-building  process needed to achieve
sustainable recovery in Bosnia.
3.22. A  further consequence of  the  lack  of
decentralisation to  the Commission  Delegation in
Sarajevo has been the slowness of the programme
implementation procedures (see paragraphs 3.28
3.50). This approach is in marked conrrast to that
selected for  the European Union's reconstruction
programme  in Mostar, where 39 expatriate civilian staff
were employed to administer the programme on the
spot.
3.23. In the same context, it  should be noted that
CAFAO (28), which is one of the Commission's  most
successful  operations in Bosnia (see paragraphs  4.58 - 4.59), is managed in a highly decentralised  manner  by
DG XXI (2e). The office of around 35 staff thus operates
under the authority of the local representative, a DG XXI
consultant.  The latter has considerable independence and
carries the responsibility of implementing its programme
himself, without excessive intervention by Commission
headquarters.
3.24. In 1996 the
decentralisation  of
around a  dozen expatriate staff and some twenty
locally-employed staff. Similarly, USAID, the third largest
donor, set up an office in Sarajevo with l;ome twenty
expatriate staff and around one hundred local staff to
cover the whole of Bosnia.
3.25. The lack of an implementation prc,gramme for
both the allocation of aid and the strengthening  and
restructuring  of DG IA's departments is partly linked to
the  turnover among directors responsible for
reconstruction  in former Yugoslavia.  In the beginning
and until October 1,996 two separate directorates in
DG IA were responsible for managing  the reconstruction
programme: the first for PHARE and the second for the
other budget headings. Both directors  were replaced at
the end of 1,996 by a single director who, in turn, was
transferred in mid-1997,but  the latter's replacernent was
not appointed until November 1,997. This lack of
continuity in  programme managernent  slowed down
decision-taking  and led to prevarication among those
responsible for implementation.
Organisation of ECHO departments
3.25. In contrast to DG IA, almost all the ECHO staff
responsible for Bosnia are located in  country. For
example, in  September 1997 L7 staff (including 16
experts on contract) were divided among tive regional
offices. These regional offices have considerably  increased
ECHO's performance in identifying the projects that are
likely to satisfy local needs. There is, however,  a risk that
the  arrangements  could be  jeopardised by  the
unsatisfactory procedures for renewing the contracts  of
experienced, non-permanent staff.
3.27. Whilst ECHO's operations in Bosnia are, in fact,
decentralised  in terms of personnel, its procedures for
authorising projects, contracts and payments are still
centralised.  Decentralisation in these areas could result in
even more rapid mobilisation of funds, even if it means
establishing a  system of  thresholds above which
authorisation would  have to  be  sought from
headquarters.
Programme implementation
Rate of utilisation of appropriations
3.28. Table 3 shows the main budget headings relating
to reconstruction in former Yugoslavia, with the rates of
implementation as at 31 Decernber  1,997.
'!florld Bank also opted
its operations  in Bosnia,
for extensive
where it has
(27)oJ c 175,9.6.1997.
(28)Customs  and Fiscal Assistance Office
(2e) Directorate-General  for Cusroms and Indirect Taxation.31,.7.98 f-Exl Official Journal of the European  Communities c 241,11,3
Rate of implementation of aid for
TABLE  3
rehabilitation  and reconstruction in former Yugoslavia
situation at 31 December  1997
financed from the 1996  and' 1997 budgets,
(1) Article  B7-i00 does not contain  an,v annual budget  allocation for reconstruction in former Yugoslavia'
(2) The figures  do not include the economic  aid to FYROM, namely  23 Mio ECU.
ir) fn.  budg.t allocation for refugees for 1997 is included in the reconstruction allocationi
(a) The revised budger for payment appropriations  includes 14 Mio ECU of 1'996 appropriations carried over exceptionalLy to 1997'
is1 gCHO does not ,.t " .p..ifi. budgetarv  allocation  for irs rehabilitation  measures in former Yugoslavia'
(Mio ECU)
Budget heading Budget article
Commitment  appropriations Payment appropriations
Calldown
rate ot
commrt-
ments
entered
into
(%)
Budget  Orig Budget  Rev
Commit-
ments
Budget  Orig Budget Rev Payments
Phare 87-500 (1) 1996
87-500 (1) t997
B7-s43 (2) 1997
128,00
0,00
1,27,00
128,00
0,00
73.00
128,00
0,00
73.00
50,52
41.,28
1L5,00
50,52
41,,28
)) \o
50,52
41,28
0,68
39,47
0,00
0,93
'ii,ot
Reconstruction B7-541. 1.995
B7-54r  1997
33,00
58,00
33,00
120,40
32,90
1,1.9,r0
)) oo
55,00
22,00
40,00
470
22,87
14,29
19,20
1.8t1{
Refugees B7-s42 e)  1.996
1,997
30,00
0,00
30,00
0,00
30,00
0,00
30,00
0,00
30,00
0,00
4,I0
0,00
13,67
Jb,no.
r:i! 1:::;i: I
4;t0 l ,t,,,,,,{:lr,ii
Europe for Sarajevo B7-54s  1996
B7-545 (4) 1997
35,00
30,00
35,00
23,60
35,00
23,60
25,00
15,00
25,00
19,00
0,50
4,r3
L,43
17,50
4i  t'
,' V,90
Customs  assistance
missions in  association
rvith Bosnia-Herzegovina
B7-7002 1.996
B7-544  1997
7,1'0
4,1.0
7,1.0
8,10
7 r\0
8,10
7,1'0
4,00
7,I0
7,00
7,1.0
4,76
100,00
58,77
li,li'o,:
lr':.:,,'rr': *[;ia: r11,S6  l
78;0,3
.::.:..,;!.:!',:'::
Action concerning
anti-personnel  mines
B7-615  1996
B7-661, 1997
6,70
2,40
6,70
2,40
6,70
0,00
6,70
2,40
6,70
2,40
3,40
0,00
50,7  5
::!  arr: t::;rl!
50i?5
Subtotal  DG IA 1,996
1.997
239,80
221,,50
239,80
227,50
239,70
223,80
141.,32
1,91,40
141,32
90,90
70,32
, "', -
29,34
]?54
31,08
Subtotal ECHO
(F.7-214) 15)
1996
r997
20,06
58,63
20,05
58,53
20,06
58,63
11,14
52,9r
1,1,1.4
52,91.
11.,1.4
52,91.
55,53
90,24
P7';
1i]:li1;
, 64,CI5 81140 
|
Total Commission r996
1997
259,86
280,13
259,86
286,13
259,76
282,43
1,52,46
244,3r
152,46
143,8r
81.,46
126,63
3r,35
44,84
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3.29. Implementation of the appropriations allocated  by
the EU for reconstruction was slowed down by the lack
of an implementation programme, shortage of  staff,
excessive centralisation and the institutional weaknesses
of the local authorities. As a result, the Commission
transferred 130 Mio ECU of payment appropriations
(59,1"/' of the initial appropriations)  from the budget
headings for former Yugoslavia to other budget articles
in 1997. EIB loans and rnacro-financial  assistance  were
not utilised, whilst cooperation with the EBRD remained
very limited.
3.30. As of 31 August 1997, the latest date at which
cornparable  figures are available for all donors, the
disbursement  rate of the EU's reconstruction programme
(29 %) was relatively low compared with that of other
donors, whose average was close to 52 "/o (see Table 4).
This shortcoming appeared to be largely due to the EU's
aid implementation  procedures. At 31 December 1,997
the disbursement rate was still only 31. % (see Table 3). If
the EAP (Supply) is excluded,  the payments  .represent not
more than 17 "/" of commitments.
TABLE 4
Aid mobilised by the international  communiry at 31 August lggT
(t) The UNHCR is considered  not as a donor but as an agency which  collects  funds from donors in order to implement
action programmes.
(2) The EU administration in Mostar  was the subject of Special Report No 2/96 concerning  the administration  of Mosrar
by the European Union (OJ C 287, 30.9.1996),  the operations  financed  under  the CFSP are not discussed  in rhe oresenr
report.
Source: Vorld  Bank and Commission,  November 1997.
3.31. ECHO's  internal procedures are actually designed
to  mobilise humanitarian aid quickly (payment  of
advances representing up to 80 % of the total contracted
for  the  operarion)  and this  has improved the
irnplementation rate (the  disbursement rate  for
commitments  entered into is 74 %). ln addition, ECHO
assistance does not require the government  authorities in
the recipient country to authorise each operation  in
advance. The increased risk resulting from paying
substantial advances is,  however, lessened by  the
relatively stable relationship  between ECHO and its
partners, which  is  governed by  partnership
contracts  (30).
(30)See  Special Report No 2/97 concerning  humanitarian aid
from the European Union between t992 and 1995, OJ C
143, I2.5.1997, paragraphs 4.1 1-4.2L.
(Mio ECU)
Donor (r)
Commitments Payments
Amount (%) Amount Fraction  of
commitments (7o)
DG YA (reconstruction)
ECHO
EU administration in Mostar  (2)
422
47
36
15
2
1
123
35
35
29
74
97
Member States
Other European  countries
Arab countries
United Stares
Japan
World Bank
EBRD
Other countries
500
L97
1,47
431.
175
475
90
1,20
21
8
5
1.5
6
1.7
3
4
328
1,24
49
335
52
248
2
35
55
63
33
78
30
52
2
29
i{lfij
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3.32. Even though land-mines  kill or injure an average
of 35 people a month in Bosnia (31) and despite the fact
that mine-clearance  operations have ofren been a
prelirninary to reconstruction projects, the small amount
of donor ard avallable in this sector has been mobilised
slowly  and  cooperation on  the  part  of
Bosnia-Herzegovina  has remained very inadequate,
because of reluctance to mobilise the necessary resources.
In the case of the European Union there were no
payments from the special budget article for mine
clearance (87-61, 5  6,7 Mio  ECU), owing to  the
problems of finding contractors able to carry out the
work. In'1.997, the funds allocated to this budget heading
(87-6 61) were cut to 2,4 Mio ECU and no clearance
work had been committed as at 31 December  1997.
Project preparation
3.33. In  the case of  both PHARE aid and the
reconstruction aid (B7-5 4) the Commission's extremely
limited presence  on the ground diminished its abiliry to
analyse local circumstances and prevented  projects from
being identified and fully processed within reasonable
time-scales. All too often proposals were drawn up
following short visits by Commission consultants or
agents who had neither detailed knowledge of local
constraints nor  a  stable link  to  the  national
administrations,  both of which are essential if project
proposals are to be sound. The redefinition of the
Vukovar reconstruction project (5,3 Mio ECU) in July
1,997, a year after it had been approved,  provides a good
illustration of this (see paragraph 4.6).
3.34. The International  Management Group (IMG) set
up in 1993 under the aegis of the UNHCR (32) employs
some 140 foreign and local staff throughout Bosnia  and
approximately  60'/" of its budget is financed by the
European Union, but DG IA  has only used IMG's
services intermittently.  unlike ECHO. which has often
(11)Source: Report on  demining activities in  Bosnia and
Herzegovina by the United Nations demining action centre
between January 1996 and September 1997.
(32)IMG was set up to enable reconstruction  operations in
Bosnia to start quickly once hostilities had ended. See Special
Report No 2197 concerning  humanitarian aid from the
European Union between 1.992 and 1.995, paragraph  2.25(a),
oJ c 143, 1.2.5.1,997.
called on them. IMG's assistance is particularly useful in
examining the proposals and specifications  put forward
by the consultants  or NGOs when technical proposals are
submitted. The use of IMG in a more operational
capacity under the authority of a single Commission
representative (who would be responsible for all the
measures financed by the EU budget) is an avenue that
should be explored at the earliest opportunity.
3.35. The Commission's  approach is over-reliant on
NGO  proposals (and  could be  described as
NGO-demand driven). By acting in this way the EU
delegates  its responsibilities  to NGOs over which it does
not have adequate control. This is confirmed by the way
in which the Commission called together dozens of
NGOs on 23 January 1,998 and, without further
clarification, asked them to  submit projects for
encouraging  the return of refugees  (sum involved: 70 Mio
ECU) by L9 February L998. In 1,996 and 1,997 rhe
administrative  procedures  between submission of NGO
projects and signature  of DG IA contracts normally  took
six months. In some cases, projects had to be redesigned
because they were overtaken by events during these
administrative delays.
Contracting
3.36. The existence  of two Regulations  (see Annex 1,
paragraph  2) for similar operations  (33) has hampered the
Cornmission's  managerial task. For example, at the end
of 1,997 contracts were still being processed  by two
departments,  depending on the financing source used (34),
despite the similarity of the measures in question.
3.37. The general conditions  for PHARE contracts are
designed for technical assistance to support economic
restructuring measures, rather  than  priority
reconstruction programrnes. In an atternpt to remedy this
shortcoming, the Commission  made an exception  for the
EAP, so that contracts  were awarded  following restricted
invitations to tender. Table 5 sets out the procedures
under which these conffacts were awarded.
(33)The third Regulation on emergency aid applies  only to the
operations funded by ECHO.
(3a)Directorate B for PHARE  conrracts and Directorate  F for
contracts financed in accordance  with Regulation  (EC) No
1.628t96.c 241,11,6 TENI Official Journal of the European Communities 31.7.98
TABLE  5
Procedure for awarding contracts  under the essential aid programme (EAP) (supplies)
Awarded by: Cases where  applicabie Value of contract
Minimum
number of
enterprises
to be
consulted
Minimum time
allowed for
submission  of tender
Private
treaty
a) humanitarian measures
b) purchase of spare parts
c) any contract for less than 10 000
ECU
not significant I unspecified
Consultation
by fax
a) all contracts for a value of more
than 10 000 ECU and less than
100 000 ECU
reconstruction and housing  or
supply of equipment  for public
administration
b)
a) less than
100 000 ECU
b) between
100 000 ECU
and  1  Mio
ECU
c) more than
1 Mio ECU
5
.7
1,2
5 days
10 days
15 days
Restricted
call for
tenders
Ary  contract  outside the  above
categories
a) becween
100 000 ECU
and  1  Mio
ECU
b) more than
1 Mio ECU
5
t2
10 days
2L days
3.38. Two procurernent  agencies  concluded contracts
totalling 73 Mio  ECU (see paragraph 3.5) with
enterprises in Member States or PHARE countries under
the EAP. The Commission took 3,7 Mio ECU from
programme  funds in order to pay these intermediaries.
3.39. Review of a sample of 76 contracts  accounting  for
71% of the purchases  made under the EAP (Supply)
revealed  the following shortcomings:
a) the procurement agencies' files contained no written
account of the criteria used to select the tenderers that  e)
were on the restricted lists. In many cases the
enterprises from which tenders were sought did not
make bids because they did not produce the type of
goods requested;
b) on average, fewer than two tenders were received that
actually complied with the technical specifications
governing  the contracts  and there was, therefore,  very
little price competition;
c) in 46 "/" of the cases examined, the lowest tender
was higher than the budget for the operation, so
that other measures  had to  be allandoned in
consequence.  It was actually not in the procurement
agencies'  interest for the prices tendered to be the
lowest possible because their remurLeration  was
calculated  as a percentage of the contra(lt price;
d) in 39 o/" of cases the enterprises
been allowed the minimum time
tenders  (see Table 5):
consulted had not
for submitting  their
one of the agencies refused to pay successful  tenderers
the 60 Y" advances stipulated for supplies contracts  in
the PHARE Regulation, which meanr that fewer
tenders were received and also allowed r:he agency to
retain substantial funds at the bank for an extended
period;
the other agency was unable to show vvho had been
present in  the tender examination  committee.
Furthermore in the case of both cornmittees  the
commiftee  members had not signed declarations  of
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g) the procurement  agencies several times sought bids - 
from enterprises that were unlikely to be interested in
tendering,  solely for the purpose of establishing  a
geographical balance between the tenderers for the
contrafi  concerned;
h) the main contract in the electricity sector (4'9 Mio
ECU, increased to  6,4 Mio ECU following an
amendment of the contract) was awarded  to the only
enterprise that had submitted a tender for each of the
19 lots. The various items could have been obtained
at considerably lower cost (35) if the contracts  had
been awarded lot-by-lot, as was the case with other
contracts. This method would have cost the
procurernent  agency more in administrative terms'
however, and its remuneration for the operation
would thus have been proportionately  lower;
i)  in the case of three contracts involving agricultural
supplies to a value of 990 385 ECU the contracts
*.r.  ,*"tded to enterprises whose bids were not the
most advantageous or to enterprises whose bids were
unacceptable.
3.40. \Thilst Croatia has access to contracts  financed  on
the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1628/96, it did not have
access to PHARE contracts and was excluded from the
EAP, even though it  has always been Bosnia's  main
supplier.  Moreover, whilst the PHARE Regulation allows
access to PHARE contracts for all countries  participating
in the prograrnme, those same countries  do not have
access to the contracts funded on the basis of Regulation
(EC) No 1,628196. Such distinctions are absurd.
3.41.. Regulation No 1'628196  allows service  contracts
for a value of less than 200 000 ECU to be awarded by
private treaty, in order to speed up implementation of the
ieconstruction  programme. The Regulation does not'
however, contain a similar derogation ftlr supplies  and
works contracts, even thou gh a far higher proportion of
aid is mobilised in that waY'
3.42. As of end-1'997, of the contracts  concluded by
DG IA outside the EAP only 11,,3 "/" by value had been
awarded following invitations  to tender (see Table 5). In
fact,  88,7'/o of  contracts were concluded with
non-profit-making  organisations  (NGOs, public bodies
and  international organisations) or  under other
circumstances where the Financial Regulation (Article
11S(2)) permits private treaty' All the ECHO contracts
were alio  concluded with NGOs or  international
organisations,  but under the procedures applicable  to
hulmanitarian  aid (36). However, for  reasons of
transparency, and given the competition  to which these
organisations  are exposed in  order to  obtain EU
subsidies, the selection of each operator should be
justified by a note from the commission's operational
departments detailing, inter alia' the organisation's
privious work  and the  quality of  the  services
provided (37).
(36)Council  Regulation (EC) No 1257196 of 20 June 1'996,
OJ L 163, 2.7.1,996, P. 1-
(3t)S.e Special Report No 2/97 concerning humanitarian^aid
from the European Union between 1992 and 1'995,
OJ C 143, 1.2.5.1997, paragraphs  3.L3 and 3'15'
(35)The Court estimates that the
achieved by contracting each
ol 978 000 ECU.
savings that could have been
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TABLE 5
Method of awarding contracts under the reconstruction programmes  (non-EAPI {1,1,1,996-3l.12.1997\
TOTAL
Conrractor
Private treaty
NGO
International  organisations  (1)
Bosnian institutions
Framework contracts
Amounts  below
threshold
statutory
27,94
49,08
3,52
4,20
4,00
Calls for tenders
(Mio ECU)
(t) UNHCR contracts represenc  37 o/o of total value
Regulation (EC) No 1628195
3.43. Many contracts concluded with  NGOs or
international organisations  comprise  a high proportion of
work that is subcontracted  to construction companies, in
principle following invitations to tender. Until August
1,997 international invitations  ro tender were required for
contracts between the Commission and NGOs whenever
operations  were valued over 10 000 ECU, which slowed
such operations down. In the case of PHARE, the
procedures  for irnplernenting works contracts were not
adopted until November  1,997.
3.44. DG IA did not atrempr to limit the fees paid to
NGOs and international  organisations  and did not reach
an agreement with ECHO in order to ensure that the
Commission follows a  uniform approach when the
operations in quesrion are of a similar nature (38). For
example, DG IA accepts a considerably higher level of
fees than those accepted by ECHO for  identical
operations. Moreover,  there are considerable  differences
in fees, from contract to contract (between 2 566 and 12
100 ECU per month (3e)).
(38)See Special Report No 2/97 concerning humanitarian aid
from the European Union between L992 and !995,
OJ C 143, t2.5.1.997, paragraphs  4.23 and 4.24.
(3e)According to the ECHO scale the top rate of fees for
expatriates  is 3 800 ECU per moth.
3.45. In former Yugoslavia ECHO's rnonthly-fee scale
for local staff is 280 ECU, which is far too low for
NGOs to be able to recruit and keep quality local
staff (40). ECHO operational  contracts proved to  be
unsuitable for relatively  complex rehabilitation projects,
in  the sense that no final version of the project
specifications  was drawn up and there were no rules for
setting the guarantee period for works or determining  the
retentions to be made pending acceptance  of the works.
Payments
3.46. Projects were often held up as a result of the
slowness  with which advances were paid. A review of the
contracts  financed under Regulation No  1628196
revealed that in 40 % of cases the Commission  had still
not paid any advance  three full rnonths after work on the
contracts had started, which is late for contracts whose
duration is  often limited to  six monrhs and for
beneficiary organisations  whose cash flow is usually
small.
(a0)Special Report No 2/97 concerning
the European Union between 1992
1,2.5.1,997,  paragraph 4.22 (c).
humanitarian  aid from
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3.47. In half of the cases the delays were due to the fact
that NGOs' applications  were not submitted in good and
due form. The bank guarantee  procedures  caused many
delays where DG IA was concerned, whereas ECHO  does
not require guarantees  for sirnilar operations.
3.48. In  other cases the  Commission's internal
administrative  procedures  were the cause of the delay.
For example, applications  for advances must be approved
by operational departments  that are aheady overloaded.
The approval is purely formal and is unnecessary  when a
contract has been duly concluded (41). Delays also arose
as a result of the fact that the Comrnission  departments
were slow in processing files, despite the urgency of the
operations  concerned.
3.49. The case of the rehabilitation of a small part of
Bosnia's National Parliament building, which is
questionable in itself (it involved the renewal of the first
floor of the six-storey building, but did not include the
central first-floor  chamber) and was co-financed by the
'World Bank, provides a good example  of the difficulties
caused by late payments. Even though completion of the
project was planned for the end of October '1"996, the
contracts relating to the European Union's contribution
were not signed until ApriI"l.997,  with August 1997 as
the new expiry date (a L0-month delay). Despite this
initial delay, the Financial Controller (DG XX) blocked
the advance-payment application submitted  in May 1,997,
taking the view that the advance should be paid in ecu
and not German marks, despite the terms of both the
financing agreernent and the contract. DG XX insisted
that the financing  agreement  and the contract must be
amended, and the advance was not paid until October
1997 in consequence.  This first advance made it possible
to start work, but progress was again hindered  by the
Commission's tardiness in paying subsequent  advances.
Until the work financed by the Commission  makes it
possible to complete the 'til7orld Bank's part, which was
almost finished in Februa ry "1.997, the Parliament of the
State of Bosnia-Herzegovina  sat in other buildings  that
had been renovated  by another donor.
3.50. Under the  EAP (Supply) progress  on
housing-sector  projects was hampered by delays in the
(41)Under the TACIS programme administered  by DG IA,
applications  for advances  are not subject to approval by
operational  departments. The accountant must in all cases
ensure that the payment is accompanied  by the supporring
documents stipulated in the Financial Regulation.
payments that the procurement agency was to make to
enterprises from Bosnia-Heruegovina. Some enterprises
were obliged to suspend or slow down their work in
order to avoid suspending payment themselves.  This
situation was the result of the inefficient  procedures  set
up iointly by the Commission and the agency and was
made worse by the shortcomings  of the banking  systern
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Proiect monitoring and eualuation
3.51. Except for humanitarian aid, there is no consistent
mechanism for monitoring and evaluating reconstruction
activities (B7-5 0 and B7-5 4). The logical framework
rnethod that is applied to other external aid is not used in
the preparation of the Commission's  financing proposals.
Moreover, none of the Commission's  offices in Bosnia or
Croatia are equipped to undertake  a serious review of the
operations.
3.52. The Commission  engaged consultants to oversee
the EAP (Supply) in May "1"996, four months after the
programme had started. Initially their effectiveness was
diminished because their mandate conflicted with that of
the  procurement agencies, which had their own
representatives in  Bosnia. The Comrnission did not
institute procedures for  following up  consultants'
observations and recornmendations  quickly. It financed
an evaluation of the EAP (Supply) in October L997,, but
the findings  are not expected to be known before April
1998. The accounts of the programme  funded by the
Commission  must be audited when the results have been
published.
3.53. The Commission did not pay sufficient  attention
to certain financial  aspects of the EAP:
a) in the agricultural sector, the Comrnission did not
adopt procedures for  rnanaging the counterpart
funds (a2) generated by sales of  supplies (motor
cultivators: 4,6 Mio ECU; pesticides: 0,25 Mio ECU)
(see paragraph 4.51);
b) there were no arrangernents for checking  the interest
earned by the procurement agencies on the cash
advances paid by the Commission, even though the
interest in question amounted to at least L,21 Mio
ECU at the end of 1,997:
(42)Funds generated  by the sale to final beneficiaries  of goods
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c) lastly, the Commission  did not institute  basic
accounting  controls for advances.  For exarnple, it did
not require funds received, expenditure paid and
funds available at bank to be reconciled at regular
intervals. The Court thus found that the sum of the
advances recorded in one agency's accounts  was 89
527 ECU lower than the payments  recorded by the
Commission.
3.54. Outside the EAP, DG IA set up a system during
the second half of 1997 to monitor the housing sector in
Bosnia, but it  did  not  organise any continuous
monitoring for the rest of the reconstruction programme,
which nevertheless  accounted  for 70 % of all the funds
committed as of 3L Decernber 1.997.
3.55. Although the UNHCR was also paid by the
Commission  to oversee utilisation of the 45 Mio ECU of
reconstruction projects that DG IA and ECHO financed
through it, several difficulties  were noted with regard to
the management of the operations:
al UNHCR  usually uses the same NGOs as the
Commission  to carry out reconstruction projects. The
EU pays the UNHCR to verify technical aspects of
the operations, even though the latter has very little
experience in this field. The Commission would
achieve  a better cost/efficiency  rario if it implemented
the housing-reconstruction  projects itself via the
NGOs;
b) in several  cases (43) Commission  funds were allocated
by UNHCR  as finance for projects other than those
provided for in the contracts concluded between the
Commission and UNHCR. Faced with  a  fait
accompli, the Commission  systematically  approved
the amendments  ex post facto. In other cases the
amounts allocated to some subprojects were increased
significantly, to the detriment of others, but the
Commission  was not informed  before the end of the
contract;
c) the Commission  did nor require the UNHCR to
forward the subcontracting agreements concluded
with its partners. This lack of information makes it
(43)Including  the DG IA conrrac of October 1996 for
reconstruction in eastern Slavonia (see paragraph 4.13 (d),
2,7 Mio ECU) and the ECHO contracr of June 1995
covering  operations  in Bosnia-Herzegovina  (28 Mio ECU).
practically  impossible  for Commission departments  to
carty out proper supervision  (aa);
d) in the case of one housing-repair contract financed by
the Comrnission through the UNHCR in the canton
of Una Sana, it was not possible for the Court to gain
assurance  as to the use of 459 000 DM of materials
that were invoiced in respect of apartmt:nts repaired
in Velika Kladusa.
4. IMPACT  OF THE OPERATIONS
Geographical  distribution
Entities constituting  B osnia-H erzegouina
4.1,. The Federation  received approximately  90 o/" of the
aid. Although it had been intended that :i0 o/" of the
funds should be allocated  to Republika Srpska, failure to
comply with the political conditions  imposed by the
European Union and some aspects of  the Dayton
Agreement led to the aid being suspended  several  times in
borh 1996 and "1.997, notably in an artempt to bring war
crirninals to justice. In neither entity, on the other hand,
was aid conditional on the progress cf  economic
reforms.
4.2.  In terms of projects  very little has been achieved by
way of bringing the two entities together. The main
action in this area was the re-establishment  of telephone
communications (see paragraph 4.46). Some housing
repair projects (notably in Posavina)  also gaLve rise to a
certain amount of trade between entities.
Sarajevo
4.3. Mobilisation of the 65 Mio ECU funding allocated
to Sarajevo by DG IA in  1996 and 1,99'7 has been
extremely slow and had had little effect by the end of
1.997. Among the main reasons for this are the difficulty
the Commission  has had in establishing a construcrive
dialogue with the Sarajevo authorities  and the fact that
within DG IA one person has been designated ro manage
both the Europe for Sarajevo and the refugee-return
programmes.
(aa)Special Report No 2/97 concerning humanitarian  aid from
the European Union between 1992 and 1,995, OJ C 143,
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Una Sana (Federation)
4.4. Although  this canton is a priority area, because of
its high potential for refugee return frorn EU Member
States (45), action in the area has been modest. In August
1,996 the Federation authorities submitted  a 39,5 Mio
ECU programme  proposal for  the canton to  the
Commission, following consultation  with Germany  (46),
but the Commission did not think it possible to base a
financing plan on the proposal. At the end of 1'997 no
overall plan had been adopted and no integrated
programme had yet been proposed.
Brcko (Republika  Srpska )
4.5. Only after the deferral, in February  1.997, of the
arbitration  decision on the future of the town did the
donor comrnunity  elect to make this a priority area for
reconstruction aid. As of end-1997, DG IA had still not
taken any significant action. In fact, even though 2 Mio
ECU was allocated to an integrated programme for
returnees to  Brcko under the reoriented EAP in
November 1996, the contract to implement this measure
had still not been signed at the end of 1.997.
Croatia
4.6. Although a 5,29 Mio ECU programrne  to assist the
very heavily  damaged  town of Vukovar  was approved  by
the Commission in July L996, the Commission aid had
very little impact in 1996 because the project was badly
prepared and had to be redefined in July 1997 (see
paragraph 3.33). By the end of 1.997 funding for the
repair of apartments and water and electricity supply
networks was beginning  to have an effect.
4.7. A major housing  repair scheme (2,7 Mto ECU) for
implementation by the UNHCR in front-line villages of
eastern Slavonia has been blocked for more than a year
because of the obstructive attitude of the Croatian
authorities. In this case, too, the UNHCR's project
(as)The UNHCR forecast for this canton in 1997 was 27 000
people returning, which is 1,7"/" of the forecast for the entire
Federation.
(a5)According  to the UNHCR there were still 220 000 refugees
who had originated  in Bosnia-Herzegovina  and were Iiving in
Germany without the prospect of permanent  accommodation
at the end of 1997.
groundwork was, by  and large, insufficient (see
paragraph 3.55). The Croatian government is itself
making a significant effort towards reconstruction in the
region and is seeking to give returning Croats priority
over returnees of Serb origin.
Sectoral distribution
Housing and refugee return
4.8. The return of refugees to Bosnia is one of the main
priorities of  the  EU  programmes. Under these
circumstances the impact of housing repair measures
cannot be assessed solely in terrns of the extent and
quality of the repairs: their effect on refugee return must
also be taken into account. ECHO has tried to
complement the action taken by DG IA and has focused
its own intervention  on internally displaced persons and
those directly affected by the war.
4.9. According  to the I-INHCR, refugee return was
much less than expected, in both 1996 and 1,997. In
1996 some 88 000 refugees  returned, as against a tatget
of 200 000, and in 1.997 106 000 refugees returned'
compared with forecasts of 200 000. Refugees' plans to
return are still significantly affected by the continuing
political and security  problems within the country,  as
well as the slowness of the reconstruction  process (47).
Moreover,  the return of the most highly-qualified  people
is the most difficult to organize and this is delaying
economic  recovery still further.
4.1,0. The cost of the damage in the housing sector has
been estimated at 4 000 Mio USD (08). Approximately
half of the 1,3 Mio homes, 80 7o of which were privately
owned, suffered war damage. Commission  funding
represented approximately 32 %  of  all  donor
commitments, but only 8 "/" of donor disbursements for
the"l.996-97  perrod.
(ot)At the end of 1997 UNHCR  estimated  that the number of
refugees  remaining in  EU Member States was around
263 000 (consolidated  appeal for 1998; repatriation and
return operation 1998), In addition to this rhere were
335 000 refugees in other former Yugoslav  republics  and
800 000 persons displaced rvithin Bosnia.
(as)-V7orld Bank Reconstruction  Program:  sectoral programs  and
priorities, AprrI 7996.c 241,122 tEN I Official Journal of the European  Communities 31,.7.98
4.1,1,. Housing reconstruction under the first tranche of
the EAP started just before winter 1996-97. At that time
the Commission was uncertain whether to  supply
materials or carry out entire projects. As a rule other
housing  reconstruction  projects (non-EAP) did not get
under way until the second half of 1.997, firstly, because
of the delays inherent in the Comrnunity  procedures  for
examining proiect proposals (see paragraph  3.35) and,
secondly, because the NGOs found it difficult to identify
beneficiaries and housing  which met the Dayton criteria
for refugee return and were acceptable to the local
authorities.
4.1.2. By 31 December 1997 the Comnrission had
funded repairs to  approximately  1,0 700 individual
houses, of  which 6 300 had been completed. This
represents 2 "/" of the total repairs to be carried out. In
the interests of effectiveness,  the work had., until that
date, systematically concentrated on the lea.st damaged
homes, because  they were the least expensive to repair.
Table 7 shows the main private-housing  reprair schemes
contracted out by the Commission.
t I
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TABLE  7
Implementation of individual housing repair projects (7996-19971
(excluding communal areas of buildings)
Project start between
Commission
department
Project  value
(Mio ECU)
Number  of
homes
rehabilitated at
31..1.2.1.997
Number  of
homes in course
of rehabilitation
at 3L.1,2.t997
Total number of
homes
January  and June
t996
DG VA
ECHO ?)
J)L L 785 0 | 785
July and December
L996
DG VA
ECHO
13,2
2r0
I 410
469
325
0
1.73s
469
January  and June
1997
DG VA
ECHO
74,0
6,6
1 089
73
| 1.82
840
2 27L
91.3
July and December
L997
DG VA
ECHO
14,4
14,0
1 422
81
620
I 385
2 042
r 467
8ii#g,$
i;iiir:iiiiiri iri
iiii'iiii ii ii,ii,
iii*iif#H
:i: i :l::::  i:i  I i li:i,i i:
Source: Court of Auditors
4.13. In a number of cases it was not possible to carry
out all the housing  repairs that were provided for in the
contracts.  For example:
a) in Gorazde (ae) 400 homes were to be repaired under
the EAP at a total cost of 2.33 Mio ECU. Onlv 42
were finished. '$7ork on a further 334 homes was
abandoned, leaving fwo thirds of  these houses
uninhabitable.  No start was made on the repairs to
the rernaining 24 homes. The NGO reslronsible for
the project over-paid the construction company by
787 000 DM, which has never been recovered by the
Commission. These problems  occurred  €:ven though
the proiect was supervised by three agencies:  the
procurement agency, the NGO responsible  for (ae)Enclave  of the Federation  in eastern Bosnia.31.7.98 f EN I Official Journal of the European Communities c 241.123
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coordinating the work and the consultants  responsible
for monitoring  the EAP;
b) at  Bosanska KruPa  (Una  Sana)  a
UNHcR-implemented  proiect for the total repair of
400 houses was converted into a project for the repair
of 500 roofs, as the municipality had given the
UNHCR  an undertaking that it would carry out the
rest of the work. In the end only 435 roofs were
repaired and the municipality did not respect  its
undertaking, with the result that in September  1'997
half the houses were still unoccupied because they
were uninhabitable;
c) at Stolac (Mostar region) 100 houses were to be
repaired (0,9 Mio ECU) to house Muslim refugees.
Only 56 houses were repaired  and around 20 of them
were occupied in September 1,997. There was, in fact,
strong Croatian opposition to the return of these
refugees  and two of the repaired houses were set on
fire:
d) in eastern Slavonia the UNHCR received 2,7 Mio
ECU in October 1'996 for the rebuilding  of 600
houses in  two  pilot  villages (Antunovac  and
Ernestinovo)  on the front-line' As of Septembet  1'997
none of the homes had been repaired and only 20
proposals had been approved by the Croatian
authorities. It was only in Octobet 1'997 that the
UNHCR advised the Comrnission  of the difficulties  it
was experiencing  and proposed to cut the number of
dwellings for repair to 325, so as to release funds for
the renovation of public buildings (schools, health
centfes. etc).
contracts for projects. The Commission  adopted this
50 % limit so as not to create resentment among the
people who remained in Bosnia during the war.
4.1.5. There were two possible solutions to the problem
of which refugees  should benefit through Commission
reconstruction proj ects  :
a) to identify refugees who wanted to return provided
that accommodation  was available  for them and only
then to carry out the rePairs;
b) to  carry out reconstruction  work in areas where
refugees were likely to resettle and to allocate the
hornes to  families that had already returned to
Bosnia, thus encouraging those remaining in host
countries to return.
In practice following the first approach  was difficult,
because of the time neeed for identify refugees in
Member  States. Although the second approach has been
widely followed, it  cannot be established  that the
rehabilitation of housing stock was a cause of the
refugees' return.
4.1,6. In view of the very large volume of essential
repairs and the limited  resources  available, the number  of
homes repaired  would have been much greater if the
most disadvantaged people (usually people who had
remained in Bosnia during the war) had been given
priority when the funds were allocated. It would then
have been necessary to combine this system of grants
with a system of subsidised loans for the better-off, who,
as a general rule, were refugees.
4.1,7. Policy in this area has, in fact, remained  unclear'
Not until October 1997 was a loan scheme developed in
cooperation with the Kfw. 
.whereas the beneficiaries  of
Cornmission projects undertaken through UNHCR were
selected  on the basis of economic  and social criteria (50),
those criteria wete not normally  included in the contracts
concluded directly between the Commission and NGOs,
with the result that the terms on which beneficiaries wefe
selected varied widely from one NGO to another.
4.18. The final impact of these projects has been lower
than the nurnber oi repairs would suggest:  many of the
renovated houses have remained unoccupied' For
example,  40 % of the houses  renovated  during the "1'996
project in Una Sana were still unoccupied in .August
1ggZ. In rnany cases they remained  unoccupied because
the repair work was carried out in isolation,  instead of
(50)Households  with at least one handicapped person or one
person over the age of 55; average  monthly  income less chan
25 DM.
4.14. In the longer term the 67,4 Mio ECU mobilised by
the Commission for housing  (see Table 7) is to benefit
some 10 000 refugees who fled to EU Member States,  as
well as 37 500 other beneficiaries (displaced persons'
mainly). At the end of 1'997 the Court estimated the
number of people who had been rehoused in this way to
be around 5 000 refugees and 22 500 displaced  persons'
ln 1,995 most of the beneficiaries  of the reconstruction
work were displaced persons, because the Commission
had not adopted any housing programme that gave
priority to refugees.  Since then, and for most of the
projects funded rn 1'997, the Commission  has tried to
ir,r.rr. that 50 '/" of beneficiary households  are refugees
returning from EU Member States, but it  has not
systematically  included this requirement in the mainc 241t24 l-EN I Official Journal of the European Communities 3r.7.98
forming part of an integrated
social infrastructure. water and
creation.
project that encompassed
electricity supply and job
4.1.9. Most of the building  repair projecs for buildings
under rnultiple occuparion  were confined to the repair of
roofs, windows and the comrnunal  areas of buildings. By
the end of December 1997 some 6 270 apartments  (75 %
of thern in Sarajevo)  had been repaired in this way under
the 1996 and 1997 budgets. Most of the beneficiaries
were already living in  the apartments in  question.
Whereas in  Bosnia repairs to the private areas of
buildings had barely begun by the end of 1997, because
of problerns of establishing ownership, in Vukovar, on
the other hand, repair work covered the complete
renovation  of two buildings  containing a total of 1,42
individual  apartments  and was expected to be completed
by the end of 1997 (cost 3,4 Mio ECU). In Vukovar the
Commission funded a joint comrnitree for  housing
allocation, which significantly improved transparency.
Education
4.20. Half the schools were seriously damaged or
destroyed  as a result of the war and there has been no
regular education  budget since the 1991,-92  academic
year. The schools that remained  open were short of
teachers,  basic furniture and educational  materials.  In
1996-97 Commission  commitments  and disbursements
amounted to  29 %  and 21 %  of  total  donor
comrnitrnents  and disbursements.
4.21. Under the EAP 2 Mio ECU was allocated to the
education sector, for the supply of furniture to schools.
The programme  covered about 20 % of the Federation's
primary school needs. As the furniture  was supplied  by a
local enterprise,  the programme provided  some impetus
to the restarting  of the economy in the country. However
the furniture  was of poor quality and the criteria  used to
designate the beneficiary schools were nor rransparent.
The DG IA funds would have been better rp.ni if the
schools  repaired  by ECHO had been given priority  when
the funds were allocared, as the choice of them was
justified.
4.22. The school rehabilitation projects handled by
ECHO have had a  significant impact, in  that
approximately  L00 schools had been repaired under the
1996 and 1997 programmes by the end of 1997.
Nevertheless, many schools were still suffering from
shortages of teaching staff and educational materials  at
that date. Vhile these problems are outside ECHO's
remit, it might have been expected that D'G IA would
provide technical  assistance to support andl reform the
school  system.
Health
4.23. Between  35 % and 50 "/" of health infrastructure
was affected by the war, depending on the region, and
the medical  services lost around half their staff. Shortages
of drugs and basic supplies were still a threa.t at the end
of  1997. In  1996-97 Commission commr:rmenrs  and
disbursements for this sector represented'LS  o'/" and 20 "/"
respectively of aid from all donors.
4.24. Despite its experience of health sector reforms in
central and eastern Europe the Commission has started
very few such projects in Bosnia. The low level of
funding is partly because it  has tried to work in
partnership with the Federal Ministry of Health, whose
efficiency  is undermined  by ethnic conflicts within the
Ministry. 5 Mio ECU was allocated for the purchase  of
medical equipment  and ambulances under the EAP in
1996, but the Ministry drew up distribution lists without
consulting hospitals and clinics and in consecluence  some
of  the  supplies were not  suitable for  local
requirements (51). Moreover, equipment  was held in
warehouses in Sarajevo for long periods, because of
disagreements within the Ministry.  At the end of March
1997 equipment to a value of some 2,5 Mio ECU was
still in store in Sarajevo,  even though distribution  had
started in December 1996. The Ministry was unable to
provide the Commission  with comprehensive  distribution
lists. As was the case with the education  sector, given
that ECHO had had experience of the health sector
during the war, coordination  between (lommission
departments would have been useful in ensuring  that
equipment, in particular, was channelled to the health
facilities that had been repaired by ECHO.
4.25. The Commission was to equip a laboratory for
quality control of medicines as part of a 2 Mio ECU
project funded from the remaining EAP funds;. However,
the Ministry could not decide the site of the laboratory
(whether it should be in a Croat or Muslim area) and it
(51)Several  ambulances  were allocated to hospitals that had
need of them.
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was ^ 
year before the decision on its location was
taken.
4.26. ECHO aid has had a significant impact through  a
wide-ranging programme of  repairing around 70
dispensaries.  However, the health system is still in a state
of crisis and there is a need for reform. Most of the
expenditure is still being met through humanitarian  aid,
for  which ECHO is  the largest donor. Efficient
coordination between  Commission  departments would
have allowed DG IA to fund technical assistance as a
contribution to the reform of the health sector.
Energy  (elt'ctricity and gas)
4.27. Half the generating capacity  and 60 "/" of the grid
were damaged  during the war and a large part of the
distribution  network was destroyed. The gas pipelines
also deteriorated and 54 000 unsafe and illegal
connections were made in  Saraievo.  In  1'996-97
Commission  commitments  and disbursements represented
22 % and 13 7o respectively of all donor aid-
4.28. The energy sector is the largest EAP component'
but its effectiveness has been considerably reduced,
because the Commission simply supplied equipment and
spare parts without ensuring that they were installed.
Various shortcomings  were noted during on-the-spot
visits:
a) the local electricity  companies  did not have the
necessary resources and in  consequence  some
equipment remained unused. For example, 0,9 Mio
ECU was earmarked for the repair of transformers
and high-voltage  lines to provide the electricity supply
for 10 000 people in the Turbe region of Central
Bosnia. The equipment was not installed, however,
and the electricity supply was barely sufficient for
lighting;
b) the supply of equipment  was rarely an integral part of
plans for repairing the supply networks. Deliveries
were often late, or beneficiary  authorities  were not
informed when they were to take place. For example,
the main contract for the electricity  sector (4,9 Mio
ECU) was signed in September 1996 and stated that
deliveries  were to be completed by December 1996
(see paragraph 3.40(h)). However,  only 20 % of
deliveries had been made by that date and they were
not finally completed until June 1997. Supplies of
piping (0,265 Mio ECU) for repairs to the gas
network  in Sarajevo  were delayed, with the result that
pipes from other sources were used instead;
c) the Cornmission relied on the central electricity
company to  determine the  specifications for
equipment to be supplied to its local branches.
However, since the latter were not  properly
consulted, even though they were responsible for the
repairs, some ultimately  received only part of the
equipment that they needed;
d) although a contract had been concluded with a
consultant  (see paragraph 3.52), the Commission  did
not systematically monitor the equipment  delivered
and, as of April 1'997, it did not have an inventory of
the equipment that had actuallv been installed.
4.29. The effects of the EAP in the energy sector were
mixed:
a) the EAP contributed towards the restoration of a
basic level of generating  capacity in the Muslim
enclave of Gorazde. Six transformers were supplied
but, as of April 1997, a further 40 were still needed
in order to satisfy the demand for electricity;
equipment  and spare parts were supplied to repair the
generators in the two largest thermal  power stations
in the Federation,  at Kakanj and TuzIa (2,2 Mio
ECU). The EAP provided some 12 % of the total
financing. The'S7orld Bank decided against providing
funds for the project in Tuzla, however, as the
economic justification for  the  investrnent  was
questionable  because of the size and age of the unit;
in 1996 the EAP contributed  to the recovery of coal
production  by providing some 25 % of all donor
financing for the rnines that supply the power
stations. Over the period December 1996 - 
March
1,997 the Tuzla mining company's lignite production
rose from 133 000 tonnes to 193 000 tonnes per
month (a 45 %o increase);
aid was also granted for the repair of the gas supply
network for 4 000 households in the Novi Grad
quarter of Sarajevo. The project  included the supply
of metets,  metering being an essential patt of billing
for consumption and ensuring that the distributor is
financially viable. However,  the project also covered
the provision, free of charge, of 4 000 cookers and
4 000 radiators  (0,9 Mio ECU), even though  the
\World Bank estimated that most households could
afford their own appliances.
b)
c)
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4.30. Apart from the EAP and ECHO intervention,
Commission  funding has had very limited impact on the
energy sector. Although an arnount of 13,5 Mio ECU
was cornmitted in the electricity  sector (budget heading
B7-5 41) in December 1,996, the call for tenders was not
issued until November  "1.997, because of the size of the
proiect, the slowness  of Cornmission  procedures and the
difficulty of dealing with three different distribution
companies  (s2). The additional  7 Mio ECU reallocated  to
this project frorn the EAP in November 1996 had not
been mobilised  either. For this reason no parr of the
1997 programme had begun by the end of 1,997.
4.3L. In the case of this 13,5 Mio ECU programme,  the
Comrnission's  decision to allocate 4,5 Mio ECU to each
of the three Elektropriuerda  does not meet the provisions
of Annex 9 to the Dayton agreement, which envisaged
the reunification of the public utilities which, in the
electricity, water, transport and telecornmunications
sectors,  were split between the three ethnic groups. As a
result of opposition frorn the local authorities the donor
comrnunity has only been able to irnplement this annex
gradually. In the case of the electricity reconstruction
programme  work on a straregic survey of the sector did
not begin until October 1.997, even though the donors
agreed in November  1,996 that such a study should  be
carried out. It  is  particularly irnportant for  the
reconstruction  activities, in order to identify postwar
changes in the pattern of demand before any further
investment  is undertaken.
Transport
Genera  I
4,32. In January 1996 28 "/" of the main road network
was in need of immediate  repair. None of the ten bridges
between Bosnia and Croatia were passable  and a further
70 important bridges in the interior of the country had
been seriously damaged  or destroyed. Public transport
functioned  with difficulty and Sarajevo airport was closed
to civilian flights, because of the condition  of the runway,
terminal and control rower. In  1996-97 Commission
commitments and disbursements  represented  26 % and
15 % of all donor commitments and disbursements.
4.33. Transport is the second largest sector for rhe
Commission reconstruction appropriations.  The needs of
this sector are enormous  and capable of absorbing a
substantial volume of funds. It  was not possible to
evaluate the indirect effect of  this intervention on
refugees' intentions of returning.
Urban transport
4.34. The supply of buses and the repair of rlramlines in
Sarajevo were the most visible components of the EAP.
By the end of the war there were only 20 operational
buses in Sarajevo, cornpared with 300 in  1.991.. The
supply of 33 buses under the EAP made it possible to
reopen  7 5 % of the network, albeit with a reduced
service. Nevertheless, as of April 1997, the Saraievo
public transport company still did not have the funds
that it needed in order to continue to operate  services.
Bri dges
4.35. The Bosanski  Samac bridge across the Sava which
separates Croatia and Bosnia was to be repaired as part
of the 1996 reconstruction programme  (10 Mio ECU).
This is a high-priority project for Bosnia because the
bridge is a vital part of the link between  Budapest  and
the Adriatic via Croatia and Sarajevo. The financing
decision was taken in December 1996 and the project
duration was to be 18 rnonths. At the end of 1997 the
repair work had not started. 'S(ork on clearing mines
from the area did not, in fact, begin until August '1,997
os, following a disagreernent over the choice of the
enterprise that was to design the new bridge, the contract
was not signed until Augvst 1997. As a result of the
delays, the project completion  date has been ,Jeferred by
18 months (end-1999). According to a  consukanrs'
report dated December L997, the project  cost was to be
increased from 10 to  11,5 Mio ECU, because the
foundations suffered erosion following the destruction of
the bridge. If the Commission again delays its decision
this particularly important link will not be opened until
after the vear 2000.
Roa ds
4.36. The main project (3 Mio ECU) under the roads
part of the 1996 reconstruction programme was the
restoration of 23 km of the northern corridor linking the
eastern and western parts of Republika  Srpska.  The
I
(sz)Each of the ethnic communities  in Bosnia
elecriciry supply company (Elektropriuerda).
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Serbian authorities regard this as a priority project,
because it enables traffic to cross from one area to the
other without  passing through the Federation. Although
a decision was taken in November 1,996, the call for
tenders for the works was not issued until November
1,997.
4.37. The 1997 roads prograrnme  (5,45 Mio ECU) also
included fwo other projects concerning Republika Srpska.
The first is a 1,35 Mio ECU project to rebuild the road
between Pale and Lukavica  (53), the seat of the Serb
representative in the triumvirate presidency  of the State
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The second, a L,35 Mio ECU
project for the resurfacing  of another road in the east of
Republika Srpska (from Ustipraca to Foca) would make
it possible to avoid the main road which passes through
the Muslim enclave of Gorazde. The Commission was
considering  the future of these two suspended  projects at
the end of 1,997.
4.38. Road maintenance  equipment was supplied to 18
maintenance units throughout  the country under the
EAP. The supplies had only limited impact, however,
because of  the poor quality of  the Ministry of
Transport's technical specifications for the equipment
and the very limited operating budget available to the
maintenance  units. As an example, the capacity of the
rnobile asphalt plants (five for 347 170 ECU) and rollers
(five for 332 665 ECU) was unsuitable for the volume of
resurfacing work that had to be undertaken.  Moreover,  a
mobile road laboratory purchased for Republika  Srpska
(107 459 ECU) was still unused in April 1997, because
the recipient had neither  the necessary means of transport
nor the requisite  know-how.
Civil aviation
4.39. In the civil aviation subsector the Commisston
contributed to  the refurbishment  of  the passenger
terminal at Sarajevo airport (6,8 Mio ECU) as part of a
project for the repair of the entire airport, in which most
Western donors have been involved since mid-1996.
4.40. Although IMG  submitted an  estirnate in
November  1996, the first emergency work did not start
until October 1.997. Due to the winter the main work
couldn't start before April 1,998. Donor coordination  on
this project has been insufficient to ensure that the
rehabilitation of the airport is designed to be a single,
jointly-funded  operation.
Water and domestic  waste management
4.41.. At the end of 1995 ir was estimated that the leaks
in 60 "h of the water supply network were so serious that
normal supply was not possible. There had been
significant  deterioration of  the sewers and waste
collection  services  had stopped. In 1,996-97 Commission
commitments  and  disbursements  in  this  sector
represented 23 % and 13 "/" of all donor commitments
and disbursements.
4.42. The EAP has had a limited impact in the water
supply sector. While the programme  did, however,  supply
equipment  and rnaterials to 62 of the 69 municipalities in
the Federation, the Commission  was unable to influence
distribution  plans and ensure that deliveries were made  as
foreseen. In  actual fact, the supplies were in  part
distributed on an arbitrary, political  basis, some of the
largest beneficiaries being in the Croatian area, where the
need was least acute. In addition, the equipment  supplied
was not always suitable for local needs, because the
technology was significantly more advanced than that of
the equipment  used before the war. For example, the
donors supplied modern leak-detecting  equipment far in
excess of Bosnia's requirements  and as a result most of it
has remained unused. Local water cornpanies  often
lacked the resources to install and use the equipment
supplied  and needed to be restructured  so that they could
carry out the repair and maintenance  programmes.
4.43. Apart frorn the EAP and humanitarian aid (6 Mio
ECU) EU reconstruction aid (20,6 Mio ECU) has
contributed relatively little towards improving water
supplies, because priority was given to drafting and
preparing calls for tenders for projects with a scope that
exceeded the emergency  repair framework. In  the
meantime  the water supply networks in some areas, such
as Sarajevo, have continued to deteriorate, with leakage
rates sometimes as high as 70 7". However, a firm base
for action in 1998 was being established.
4.44. Neither the Commission  nor any other donor has
undertaken any large-scale operations in the area of (53) A suburb of Sarajevo in the Serb entity.c 241,128 tEN I Official Journal of the European Communities 31..7.98
waste management, and there are serious risks to public
health. ECHO provided funds for a waste disposal site in
Una Sana canton (0,7 Mio ECU), but work started
without the agreernent  of the local authorities; the facility
was poorly constructed  and never used. ECHO is finding
it difficult to require the NGOs to undertake  the requisite
corrective action, because its operational  contracts  are
unsuited to rehabilitation projects. A needs assessment
for Sarajevo  was funded in the first quarter of L997 and
was to  be followed by supplies of  equipment  in
December 1997.
Telecommunications
4.45. A study by the EBRD in 1996 estirnated the total
war damage in the telecommunications  sector at 176 Mio
ECU (54). The donors made no progress in this sector in
1996, because of the opposing interests of the two
entities. In  1,996-97 Commission commitments  and
disbursements represented  33 %  and 1,6 %  of  the
international aid. Ho*.u.r, donor commitments actually
amounted  to only 17 % (30 Mio ECU) of the forecasts
for the period.
4.45. An  important breakthrough was, however,
achieved in September  1997 when 4,7 Mio ECU was
mobilised  from 1,996 appropriations  and was used as
funding for the restoration of telephone links between the
entities (albeit with a very low capacity of 30 lines, which
was saturated by the end of 1,997).It  was not possible to
achieve the objective of  increasing the number of
connections  between the entities to 90 lines before the
end of 1,997 because of security problems in Republika
Srpska.
4.47. The Federation was granted 4 Mio ECU of aid
under the 1996 budget for the purpose of restoring the
telephone network in the areas to which refugees were
returning, but the aid had still not been disbursed at the
end of 1997, The Federation  opposed it, because it was
dissatisfied with the way in which the links between the
two entities had been restored.
4.48. The progress  made in  restoring  inter-entity
telephone connections is partly due to the very strong
political  pressure brought to bear by the Commission  and
relayed through the other donors. This pressure  is
strikingly different from the attitude adopted in other
sectors  and also brought about the signing, by the three
telecommunications  services, of  a  'Memorandum of
agreed principle'which  is intended to be the precursor of
a joint law on telecomrnunications.  The three companies
are also participating in a joint training programme,
funded by the Commission (0,07 Mio ECU), which was
launched  in September 1,997.
Agriculture
4.49. Before the war 40 %  of  the pc,pulation of
Bosnia-Herzegovrna  was wholly or parily dependent  on
agriculture. Around 80 % of machinery  wias destroyed
during the war and70 "/" of the livestock slaughtered (55).
Donors (including the Commission) have nevertheless
made only a modest contribution in this sector (55) and
agriculture was not  included in  the  integrated
programmes.  In 1,996-97 Commission comnritments and
disbursements  thus amounted to 24 "/" and 20 % of all
donor commitments and disbursernents.
4.50. According to reports frorn the rnonitoring office
engaged by the Commission,  items supplied  under the
EAP included:
1 300 motor cultivators (") in the three regions of the
Federation (4,6 Mto ECU);
fertilizers and pesticides for the two entities (2,1 Mio
ECU);
equipment for the dairy sector in the Federation (0,4
Mio ECU).
4.51,. These items were distributed  too late for them to
have any impact in 1.996. Their utility was subsequently
reduced when a significant proportion of the products
proved to be unsuitable for the local conLditions.  For
example, the smaller motor cultivators (5-7 kW) were
not powerful enough for the mountainous  terrain to be
found in two of the three regions  Gorazde and
Mostar. On the other hand, the capacity of most of the
milk-refrigeration  equipment far outstripped rhe potential
output of the farms in the region. Lastly, in the main
beneficiary  region (Tuzla) the fertilizers and pesticides
that should have been distributed to farms free of charge
(ss) Source: Bosnia-Herzegovina  reconstruction program: sectoral
programs and priorities. Prepared by World Bank and
European  Commission, April 1,997.
(s5)Donors committed  only 53 oh of the funds forecast in this
sector in 1996-97.
(57)This aid corresponded to approximately 5 9" of national
requirements for this type of equipment. 'S7ithin the same
framework  the rVorld Bank funded 7,5 o/" of lequirements.
a)
b)
c)
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were, in fact, sold and the proceeds of these sales could
not be audited.
4.52. The main EU aid apart from the EAP was a 3,0
Mio  ECU import programme accompanied by  a
prograrnme of technical assistance for the Una Sana
(Federation)  and Banja Luka (Republika Srpska) regions.
The project proposal was submitted in November  1.996,
but the discussions with the NGO concerned  were not
concluded until May 1997 and the equipment (essentially
60 tractors and trailers) was only delivered between
mid-September  and mid-October 1,997. It thus arrived
too late for the 1996-97 agricultural season. However,
farm equipment  user associations involving 440 local
farmers have been set up under the technical  assistance
arrangements, as a mechanism for hiring out the tractors
and other machinery to farmers in 1998.
4.53. There was a significant increase in operations
during the second half of 1997, when the Commission
arranged for the importation of 560 cattle into the same
two regions. The first consignments were delivered at the
end of September  1,997 and in December 1997 5 000
sheep were distributed in central Bosnia (600 000 ECU).
Priuate sector deuelopment and economic  reintegration
4.54. Despite an unemployment  rate of around 60 %
(which is tempered somewhat  by the black economy)  (s8)
and the need for the country's economy to move from a
socialist systern to a market economy, the Commission
has had only a limited role in this area and has not
adopted a clear strategy for future action. ln L996-97
Commission  commitments  and disbursements represented
13 % and 7 o/" of total international  aid.
4.55. At the end of 1,997 the Commission's two largest
projects, namely  an economic  recovery programrne (15,5
Mio ECU) and an EU investment  guarantee trust fund for
Bosnia-Herzegovina  (10,5 Mio ECU), had barely started.
By the end of 1,997 the Fund had still not provided any
guarantees. In the case of guarantees the budgetary
technique employed makes it possible to provide cover
without mobilizing  funds immediately. In this instance it
(58)The  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
qnarter 1997.
would have been possible for the Commission  to devote
10,5 Mio  ECU to  projects without foregoing its
participation in the guarantee fund.
4.56. Another project that was supported involved  the
Zica \lire Drawing Factory in Sarajevo, which received
an investment  subsidy of I  Mio ECU. The enterprise
manufactures cables for the construction  industry. This
was the only Commission initiative in favour of a large
industrial enterprise. The Commission  hoped that this
initiative would stimulate employment.  It has remained  a
one-off operation.
Support for public administration
4.57. Donors faced a difficult choice in the area of
public administration,  due to the large number of new
institutions  at State, entity and canton level and the lack
of training for new and existing civil servants. Although
support in this area may put the representatives of the
local authorities in a better position to participate in the
implementation of the reconstruction  prograrnme,  the
Commission  has devoted a relatively small amount to this
area, concentrating  on the institutions at state, rather
than entity and canton level.
4.58. The Commission's main action in this area has
been the establishment of  a  Customs and Fiscal
Assistance Office (CAFAO) which reports to DG XXI
(see paragraph  3.23). CAFAO made a very significant
impact through the creation of and subsequent support
for a Federation  Customs service, which began operations
in April 1,996. Customs duties provide approximately
80 % of the Federation's budgetary resources (se). It is
unlikely that the Customs service would be able to
function without CAFAO's intervention,  partly because
of ethnic rivalries. Since the beginning  of 1997 assistance
has also been provided for the Republika Srpska  Customs
service. CAFAO, which is investigating fraud in the two
entities, forwarded to  the  Office of  the  High
Representative  a number of files on diversion of funds
totalling 53 Mio USD in L997. As of the beginning of
1,998 the diverted fiscal resources had not  been
recovered. In addition 1 150 customs officials in the two
entities are taking part in a training programme.
4.59. CAFAO drafted a temporary  Customs  law which
provides for  a  unified customs territory  in
Bosnia-Herzogovina,  but it  is not yet in force. The
(tt)kt 1997 Customs duties
DM of the Federation's
were expected to provide 500 Mio
total budget  of 615 Mio DM.
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Commission  also funded the drafting of foreign trade and
investment legislation, which was adopted in June 1,997.
It  has also provided institutional  support for  the
newly-created central bank (1 Mio ECU), as well as the
Ombudsman  (0,75 Mio ECU) and statistical  services (0,1
Mio ECU).
5. CONCLUSION
5.1. Since the political stability of the Balkans is a
matter of serious concern for the European Union, the
Council and Parliament have placed 1 000 Mio ECU at
the Commission's  disposal for the period 1,996-99, thus
ensuring that the latter is among the leading providers of
funds for the process of  reconstruction in  former
Yugoslavia.  This is in addition to the humanitarian  aid
granted by the budgetary  authority each year, which
amounted to 315 Mio ECU between the beginning of
1996 and the end of 1,997.
5.2. Ifhen the peace agreements  were signed in
December 1995 the  Commission ernphasised the
importance  of rapid reconstruction  measures  and the
necessity of coordinating these measures with the aid
from other providers  of funds in order to lend support to
the establishrnent of  new institutions which would
facilitate reconciliation  between the  three ethnic
communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina  (see footnote (1s). It
therefore  advocated that each donor deploy  adequate
resources in the areas in which it had the most experience
and expertise.
5.3. Although the political level responded to  the
urgency of the situation by adopting the decisions on aid
from the European Union very quickly, the actual
mobilisation of  the  aid  suffered a  number of
organisational setbacks, both  technical and
administrative, which were not experienced to the same
extent by most of the other donors. Thus at the end of
L997 mobilisation of aid from the European  Union was
still slow (see paragraph 3.30), the problem of the
refugees who had found shelter in a number of Member
States had still not been satisfactorily resolved for those
States (see paragraph 3.8) and, with a  few rare
exceptions, the action taken by the European  Union still
had a very low profile (see paragraph 4.34). Moreover,
delays in implementing the reconstruction measures are
particularly  apparent in Republika Srpska, due to a series
of interruptions to the aid programrne  for that entity (see
paragraphs  1.3 and 4.1).
5.4. Despite  its
paragraphs 3.1 and
clear declarations  of  intent (see
3.3). the Commission  did not succeed
in deploying sufficient human resources to the task of
reconstruction  in  former Yugoslavia,  neither at  its
headquarters in Brussels nor in the areas that were under
reconstruction  (see paragraphs 3.13 and 3.14). In this
connection it derived little benefit from the experience
acquired in Mostar, which some months earlier had
demonstrated  the importance of  having a  sufficient
number of qualified staff on the ground (6(r). Moreover
DG IA drew little benefit from the experience: acquired  by
ECHO (with which it cooperated at arm's length) (see
paragraphs 3.8 and 3.1L), nor (from the reconstruction
angle) from the work of the international management
group  (lMG)  which  had  been operating  in
Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1993 (see paragraph 3.34).
Similarly, coordination with the Office of the High
Representative  (OHR) in the country was, in practice,
too slight for the European Union to be able to occupy
the position which it should have held, given the volume
of funds which it had decided to make available (see
paragraph 3.18).
5.5. The Commission did not develop a  practical
sectoral implementation programme  for ensuring that any
coordinated  action would be taken in accordance  with
priorities which took into account the areas where its
services already had experience (see paragraph 3.3). As a
result aid was mobilised, but was dissipated before it
gathered the momentum needed for  it  to  achieve
significant sectoral impact (see paragraph 3.4). In
particular, such a strategy should reflect the importance
attached to the refuge-return  question. In this respect
more concrete collaboration between Commission  staff
and  organisations  in  Member States, UNHCR
representatives in  each country and the municipal
authorities in the areas affected bv '.'iugee return would
have been desirable.
5.6. The EAP (Supply) was not adequately prepared,  the
shortcomings  of the authorities in the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Republika Srpska were not
recognised and the Commission was over-hasty  in
assigning responsibility for the implementation of the
programme  to procurement agencies which \,vere not in a
position to verify, on the ground, whether  supplies  had
actually been distributed to beneficiaries. All these factors
resulted in  the breaking-off of  the programme  in
November 1996, after which it was converted  to projects
of the conventional type (see paragraph 3.5), thus causing
new hold-ups in the implementation  process. In the case
of the non-EAP projects the unsuitability of the existing
Regulations and the time taken to adopt the basic
(60)See Court of
92 and 93.
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regulations required for new budget headings to  be
mobilised (see Annex 1., paragraph  3) were not the only
causes of delay. The administrative delays inherent in the
Comrnission's  internal decision-taking procedures are
inadmissible in an emergency context. Furthermore  the
Comrnission departments did not systematically follow
the  procedures  for  emergency aid, even though
reconstruction projects  were difficult to irnplement using
traditional procedures for economic  restructuring  (see
paragraphs 3.33 - 
3.35).
5.7. Implementing  housing repair projects through the
UNHCR is not very satisfactory (see paragraph 3.55). It
leads to additional  delays at the approval stage, without
guaranteeing  that the works will be better executed  by
the NGOs to  which they are subcontracted. The
procedures followed by the UNHCR in implernenting
projects and the shortcomings in  its  accounting
procedures do not, in fact, allow the Commission  to keep
these operations under review. If, in this context, it is
considered essential for the Commission to contribute
funds to the UNHCR it would be administratively  more
efficient to make a global contribution in response  to its
appeals for funds, because the results obtained  would not
be any different. The specific audit requested by the
Cornmission is, in fact, an irrelevance, because of the
fungibility of UNHCR finance (61).
5.8. The number of refugees returning continued to be
much lower than expected, in both 1,996 and 1,997 (see
paragraph  4.9). In  this  context the  sometimes
discriminatory  policies of local authorities,  insecurity in
the country (see paragraph 4.91 and the way in which
housing  and infrastructure repair works were carried out
(see paragraph 4.11) were severe constraints. By the end
of 1,997 the homes of some 5 300 refugees  and displaced
persons had been repaired  through  the Commission  - 
a
very modest  achievement  (see paragraph 4.1,2). In many
cases homes remained unoccupied even after they had
been repaired, because the work had not been undertaken
within the integrated frarnework of projects which also
included  social infrastructure, water and electricity supply
and job creation (see paragraph 3.LL).
5.9. In the areas of health and education ECHO's
impact was fairly marked. On the other hand, DG IA did
not mobilise the support needed to ensure that the
government  departments  responsible for the management
of these areas functioned efficiently. Moreover the action
taken by  ECHO and  DG IA  was insufficiently
coordinated (see paragraphs  4.21., 4,22 and 4.26).In the
energy sector EAP supplies were not  adequately
monitored (see paragraph 4.28) and the effectiveness of
the aid varied. Apart from a substantial improvement in
bus and tram services in the town of Sarajevo  (see
paragraph 4.34) Commission support for the transport
sector had little impact,  because of the serious problems
encountered by the projects (see paragraphs  4.35
4.40). Lastly,. progress in  the  areas of  public
administration and economic reform was modest (3.7,
4.s4 - 
4.s7).
5.10. Two years after the Dayton and Paris agreements
the reconstruction aid rnobilised by the EU continues  to
fall short of its declared aims. This is partly due to the
problematical environment in former Yugoslavia,  but it is
also a consequence  of the Commission's  inability to
deploy sufficient human resources, as well as the poor
quality of  the  cooperation  between Commission
departments.
5.11. EU aid was scattered over an excessive number of
sectors, as a result of very limited practical coordination
with the main providers of funds and the Office of the
High Representative. This phenomenon was further
magnified by a desire to satisfy  requests  from the central
authorities  in the entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina  asking
for the Community  aid to be distributed among the main
structures  in the entities. Under these circumstances it is
important for  the  Commission to  decentralise
management  of its aid effort to the delegations  and to
focus it on a smaller number of sectors, in order to
respond better to the urgent needs of certain regions and
comrnunities that are especially affected by the question
of the peaceful return of refugees.
5.1.2. Finally, it is important for the Comrnission to
establish its credibility with the authorities in these areas
by ensuring that any support which it  provides  is
adequately publicised. Otherwise there is a danger that
the beneficiary populations  will  be unaware of  its
presence in the area. A first step in this direction could be
taken by stating clearly and visibly that Commission
measures  are funded by the European Union and not iust
bv ECHO. PHARE. CAFAO.  EAP or Obnova  (62).
(52) Obnova - 
Programme  for reconstruction in Bosnia, Croatia,
Serbia, Montenegro and FYROM,
(51)See Annual  report concerning
340, 1.2.1I.199 6, paragraphs
the financial year 1995, OJ C
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ANNEX  1
SOURCES OF FUNDING  FOR EU AID FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN FORMER  YUGOSLAVIA
1. EU aid comes from two main sources:
(a) 500 Mio ECU from the PHARE programme, 400 Mio ECU of
reconstruction in the areas of the country  that had been devastated  by
programmes  ro assist the transition  to a market economy;
(b) 400 Mio ECU, derived from the additional margin of 475 Mio ECU
action) of the L9g6-1.999 financial  perspective which was released
Summit.
which was allocated
war and 200 Mio ECU
under heading 4 (External
during the 1995 Cannes
for
for
2. These two {unding sources are, in turn, governed  by separate legal bases:
(a) with regard to the 500 Mio ECU, the Regulation governing  the PHARE programme  (1), which covers
' 
g.n.."l"budget headings  B7-5 0 0 and Ez-s + 3; Bosnia (2) and the Former  Yugosla^v  Republic of
Macedonia [fynOU)L.."-.  eligible for assistance  under this programme in 1'996 (3);
(b) a Regulation  covering  reconstruction  in Bosnia,  Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro and FYROM and
mobifising 400 lztio EtU (budget articles B7-541,87-542 andBT-54 5) (4).The Regulation did
not enter into force until August '1.996, which delayed the start of this programme (called
'Obnova').
The Commission  gave responsibility for management of the 1 000 Mio ECU to the Directorate-General
for External Relations  'Europe and the Newlylndependent  States' (DG IA). This aid is supplemented  by
humanitarian aid (budget heading  B7-21.4)  managed by another Commission  department,  the European
Community  Humanita-rian Office (ECHO) (5). Between L992 and L995 ECHO mobilised some  L 180
Mio ECU for humanitarian  aid in the whole of former Yugoslavia and was to devote an increasing
proportion of its post-war assistance  to emefgency rehabilitation  projects.
A budget heading for specific measures  concerning  anti-personnel  mines also earmarked  6,7 Mio ECU in
1,996 187-61 5) and ),4 Mb ECU in lg97 (b7-6 6 t)  for measures to be carried out in former
yugoslavia.  Finally, there wa, provision for measures  to assist the Customs  services  (CAFAO) totalling
7.1 Mio ECU in 1'996 (87-7 0 0 2) and 8,L Mio ECU in 1'997 (87-5 4 4)'
(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 1'989,OJL375,23.1'2.1,996,  p. 11.
12j Council Regularion (EC) No 753196 o{22 April 1,996,  OJ L 103,24.6.1.996-
ir) Coo.tcil Regulation (EC) No 463196 of 1L March"l,996, OJ L 65, 1'5.3.1??5-
i.; co.tncil Regulation (EC) No t628196 of 25 July L996, oI L 204, 1'4.8.1'996-
1sy fhe legal b:ase for the humanitarian  aid is Council Regulation  (EC) No 1'257196  of 20 June 1'996,
oJ L 163, 2.7.t996.
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ANNEX 2-2
Aid for reconstruction in former Yugoslavia by activity sector at 31 December  1997
(Mio ECU)
Activity sector
Commit-
ments
7o of sector
commltments
Contracts
7o of sector
contracts
Payments ''/" of total
paymenrs
Housing and refugees DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
12,0
104,3
42,3
10,4
56,9
42.3
917
25,8
35,4
Subtotal 158,6 29,25  "/" 1.09,6 38,24 
0/o 70,9 34,05  "A
Education DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
2r0
16,4
13,8
2r0
212
13,8
2r0
212
11,8
Subtotal 32,2 5,94 
o/o 18,0 6,28 o/" 16,0 7,68 
o/"
Health DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
7r0
515
8r0
8r8
0r0
8.0
815
0,0
6,1
Subtotal 20,5 3,78 "/" 1'6,8 5,86 "A 14,6 7,01 "/"
Total: Social sector 211.,3 38,97  Yo 144,4 50,38 % 101,5 48,74  o/"
Energy DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
19,8
42,0
617
18,6
0r3
6,7
18,5
0r1
415
Subtotal 68,5 1,2,63 
o/o 25,6 8,93 "/" 23,1 1,r,09 
o/o
Transport DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
15,9
51,0
0,0
14,7
2,8
0r0
1'4,7
L,6
0,0
Subtotal 66,9 12,34 yo 17,5 6,1,1.  "/" 1'6,3 7,83 "/"
'S7ater and household  waste DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
819
44,5
5r1
814
617
5,1
814
2,4
4,0
Subtotal 58,5 10,79 "/" 20,2 7,05 "A 14,8 7,1.1.  "/"
Telecommunications DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
0r0
15,8
0ro
0ro
5,8
0ro
0,0
3r8
0.0
Subtotal 15,8 2,91. "/" 5r8 2,02 
o/o 3r8 1,,82 o/"
Total: Infrastructure 209,7 38'68 "/" 69,1. 24,Lr "/" 58,0 27,85 "/"
Agriculture DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
719
1'4,L
0r0
713
418
0.0
, )"
2,9
0.0
Subtotal 22,0 4,06 "/"
"l'2,1 4,22 "/" 10,2 4,90 yo
Private  enterprise  sector DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
0,0
35,8
0,0
0r0
1'9,5
1,0
0r0
5,1
0.6
Subtotal 35,8 6,60 "/" 20,5 7,1.5 "/" \7 2,74 "/"
Public administration DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
,)\
22,1
0r0
2,8
16,1.
0,0
2r8
12,0
0,0
Subtotal 24,6 4,54 yo 18,9 6,59 yo 14,8 7,1,1, y"
Total: economic  and institutional development 82,4 15,20  "/o 51,5 77,97 "/" 30,7 14,74 y"
Other DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
0r0
17,7
1.7
0,0
717
1.7
2,6
716
1,2
Subtotal 19,4 3,58 "/" 9,4 3,28 "/" 11,4 5,49 oh
Programme management DG IA: EAP
DG IA: Projects
ECHO
7r0
71',3
1.1
718
313
1,1
416
1r0
1r0
Subtotal 1'9,4 3,58 "/" 1,2,2 4,26 "/" 6,6 3,1,7 
oA
Total: other 38,8 7,L6 yo 2t,6 7,54 o/" 18,0 8,66 "hC 241,136 tENl Official Journal of the European  Communities 31,.7.98
ANNEX 3
Commission  projects in the private housing sector 31.12.97
Location
Project
value
(Mio
ECU)
Number
of houses
already
rehabili-
tated
Number
of houses
still to be
rehabili-
tated
Total
number of
houses
Number
of
returned
EU
refugees
Number
of EU
refugees
currently
returning
Total
number of
refugees
Other
returnee
benefici-
aries
Other
benefici-
aries
currently
returning
Total
number of
other
benefici-
anes
DG VA
Gorazde 213 150 0 150 68 0 68 608 0 608
Central Bosnia 217 4s0 0 450 203 0 203 | 823 0 r 823
Central Bosnia 1 150 0 150 68 0 58 608 0 608
Una Sana 217 300 0 300 135 0 135 1,21.5 0 1.2t5
Odzak 118 360 0 350 162 0 1.62 1 458 0 1 458
Eastern Slavonia 2,7 0 32s 32s 0 1.46 1.45 0 | 31.6 1 316
uly-Dec  96 '13,2 1,41.0 32s 1,735 63s 146 781 5 7rr 1 31.6 7 027
Una Sana 3'2 543 1.76 71.9 1.225 266 7 491 | 328 504 1,832
Anvil  (RS) 0,6 110 32 1.42 1,1, z L3 407 100 507
Odzak 3,3 93 347 440 60 990 1 0s0 60 990 1 050
Una Sana 2 198 2 200 445 5 450 445 5 450
Una Sana 016 47 53 100 1.27 1.43 270 85 95 180
Una Sana 0,5 42 108 150 57 146 203 132 340 472
Central Bosnia 3r8 56 464 520 95 | 170 7 265 95 I r70 L 265
Jan-June  97 1,4 1 089 1 182 2 271 2 020 2722 4 742 2 552 3 204 5 756
Mostar region 3r3 827 41, 868 507 1,4 s21 2 582 1.66 2748
Mostar  region 2,4 253 1.68 421 467 437 904 508 282 790
Gorazde 0,5 97 1.04 0 0 0 443 25 468
Una Sana 0,8 103 74 1,77 26 t2 38 388 268 6s6
Sarajevo-Stup 2 0 130 130 0 290 290 0 290 290
Sara jevo-Dobrinja 2 0 200 200 0 450 450 0 450 450
Vukovar 314 1.42 0 r42 65 0 65 575 0 575
uly-Dec 97 1'4,4 1.422 620 2 042 1 065 1.203 2268 4 496 | 481 s 977
DGil#::itrutal 41t.;r 3,,9?X 2;,X27 ,,,6,048 3.ri.fi.,l'$i 4iSfi: tV.'t:t7:,  :ft 1.4.758 6''00? fiSii.F6i0
ECHO
Sarajevo r16 1 155 0 1 155 520 0 520 4 678 0 4 678
RS r,6 630 0 630 284 0 284 2 552 0 2 552
an-June 96 312 | 785 0 | 785 803 0 803 7 229 0 7 229
Travnik 0,49 281 0 281 t26 0 1.26 1 138 0 1 138
Lokve 0,077 35 0 35 1.6 0 1,6 142 0 1.42
Stolac 019 72 0 72 32 0 32 292 0 292
Kalesija 0,57 81 0 81 36 0 36 328 0 328
uly-Dec  96 2,037 459 0 469 21.1 0 2L1 1.899 0 L 899
Sadba 0,6 36 0 36 't6 0 1.6 146 0 14631,.7.98  t ENl Official Journal of the European Communities c 241t37
Location
Project
value
(Mio
ECU)
Number
of houses
already
rehabili-
tated
Number
of houses
still to be
rehabili-
tated
Total
number of
houses
Number
of
returned
EU
refugees
Number
of EU
refugees
cufrently
returning
Total
number of
refugees
Other
returnee
benefici-
aries
Other
benefici-
aries
currently
returning
Total
number of
other
benefici-
aries
Novi Seher 0,162 37 0 J/ 17 0 1.7 150 0 150
Gorazde, Sarajevo 1.1 0 320 0 t44 r44 0 1.296 | 296
Gorazde 2,288 0 320 0 144 r44 0 1 296 | 296
2,444 0 200 0 90 90 0 810 810
an-June  97 5,594 73 840 91,3 33 378 41,r 296 3 402 3 698
Zebina 0,35 0 40 40 0 18 18 0 162 162
Lokve 0,88 0 25 25 0 11 11 0 101 101
llovaca 0 27 27 0 1.2 L2 0 1.09 109
Gorazde 0 23 23 0 10 10 0 93 93
Maglaj 0,769 0 32 32 0 1,4 1.4 0 130 130
Kakanj 0,079 0 15 15 0 7 - 0 61 6l
Soukbunar 0r8 0 L9 T9 0 9 9 0 '71 --
Hadzici 0,68 0 -- 77 0 JJ 35 0 31.2 312
Kasatici 0,1,72 0 28 28 0 1.3 13 0 113 1.13
Vogosca 0,82 0 110 110 0 50 50 0 446 445
Faletici 014 0 52 52 0 23 23 0 21.1 2tl
Iliias 1,25 0 1.20 1.20 0 54 54 0 486 486
Novi Seher 0,1.72 0 50 50 0 23 23 0 203 203
Novi Seher 0,25 37 0
1-
J/ 1.7 0 t7 150 0 150
Kresevo 0,528 0 55 55 0 25 25 0 223 223
Kakanl 0,3 44 0 44 20 0 20 1.78 U 178
Vinac 0,3 0 JJ JJ 0 15 15 0 1,34 r34
Vitez 0,62 0 42 42 0 l9 1,9 0 170 170
Stolac 0 27 27 0 12 l2 0 1.09 r09
Glavacicevo 0,344 0 40 40 0 18 18 0 1.62 t62
Biiela 1.1 0 80 80 0 35 36 0 324 324
Osmaci 2,77 0 229 229 0 103 103 0 927 927
Celic 0,95 0 55 55 0 25 25 0 223 223
Gradac L,578 0 207 207 0 93 93 0 838 838
Jdy-Dec 97 14,022 81 1 385 | 467 37 624 66r 328 5 613 5 941
EC*I0:',total ?$i85.,1 1;{+c8i 2,,,22fii tr084j r::rt,00z 1,:0S51 *"7'52 r9 015 i;;;iidiSi:e68
Coftmlssio*:i.Tgtml 67,45i$ 6j3il9 *i:SS$ i.ri,ois,BU 4.fi,S3 s,CI73 9:t&$,6 ?'2'':,$1I t$.'0.17 17,,52V
It was assumed that 90 % of ECHO  project  beneficiaries  were in the'other beneficiaries'category  and 10 "/o were refugees.
Average number of persons per dwelling:  4,5C 241,138  t-EN I  Official Journal of the European Communities 31,.7.98
Abbreviations and acronyms
CAFAO  Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office
DM  German  Mark
EAP  Essential Aid Programme
EBRD  European  Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECHO  European  Community  Humanitarian  Office
EIB  European  Investment  Bank
EU  European Union
FYROM  Former Yugoslav  Republic of Macedonia
IMG  International  Managemenc Group
KfW  Kreditanstalt fi.ir Wiederaufbau [Reconstruction Loan Corporation]
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
OHR  Office of the High Representative
PMU  Programme  Managemenr  Unit
TACIS  Technical Assistance to the Community  of Independenr  States
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner  for Refugees
UNTAES  United Nations Temporary Administration  in Eastern Slavonia
USAID  United States Agenc,v for International  Development31,.7.98 tEN'l Official Journal of the European  Communttres c 24U39
REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION
2. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL  OBSERVATIONS
2.1,. nflithin one week of the Dayton Agreement, the
Comrnission, together with the World Bank, mobilised
the international  community  through the first donor
conference for  the reconstruction of  Bosnia and
Herzegovina held in December L995. The Commission
was able to decide at the end of 1995 to commit funds in
early 1,996 for a programme of essential  aid (the EAP
programme financed through Phare), and sent staff to
Sarajevo at the beginning of 1996 for the purpose of
setting up and monitoring  the operation. In this respect,
the Commission  provided a rapid response to the urgency
of the situation arising after the Dayton Agreement.
The Commission has been
difficult  circumstances:
working in  particularly
-  The political situation on the ground has been
unstable, with  some parties obstructing  the
application of  the peace agreements. Yet these
agreements  made the approval of  the central
authorities set up under them a precondition  for the
irnplementation of  Community programmes.
Approval  was not obtained until November fot 1'996
and September for  1,997. The Cornmission was
therefore quite unable to implement its programmes
immediately.
- 
The application of the political conditions laid down
by the High Representative and the Council of
Ministers  has posed problems. Execution has, for
example, been slowed down by the suspension of aid
to the Republika Srpska on two occasions.
- 
Complex, constrictive legal and financial instruments
are cited by the Court. The transposition,  against the
Cornrnission's  advice, of the procedures  and ceilings
of the TACIS programme  in Regulation (EC) No
1,628196  delayed that Regulation's  adoption to the
end of luly 1.996. This accounts for the need, prior to
that date, to use the trialogue procedure to obtain
funds. Until April this year, all the Commission's
proposals to  amend the  Regulation were
systematically  corrected to  make them more
restrictive.
Despite these difficulties,  by the end of ^l'996, the budget
under chapter B7-5 4 was 99.9 7o committed. At the end
of 1.997, the revised budget for chapter B7-5 4 (excluding
the financial protocol line) was 99.5 % committed.
Taking the 1.996-1.997 period together, the volume of
budgetary  resources committed by the Comrnission for
the reconstruction, including  humanitarian  aid was ECU
542.2 million of which ECU 286.6 million had been
contracted  and ECU 208.1 million paid. This rate of
contracting  and payment contrasts favourably  compared
with other external aid programmes  funded by the
Community  budget, particularly given the difficult
conditions  in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Commission has
also funded non-reconstruction activities, outside the
scope of the Court's report for which the figures are not
included above, in the field of democracy,  human rights
and CFSP joint actions.
2.2. In autumn 1,995 the Commission  published  four
communications  announcing  a comprehensive  strategy.
This strategy is  taken up  in  the  reconstruction
programme drawn up by the Commission  and the \trorld
Bank. They submitted the prograrnme to different donors
at three international  conferences, obtaining the approval
of  the  international community. Each year the
Commission draws up guidelines for the strategy's
implementation. These guidelines are then translated  into
sectoral programmes comprising a series of integrated
projects, notably for  refugees. The Memoranda  of
Understanding  signed with the Bosnian authorities for the
1,996 and 1,997 programmes  also provide an overall
framework for  the  implementation of  those
programrnes.
2.3. The essential aid programme (EAP), drawn up
straight after the Dayton Agreement and introduced  in
January 1,996, has provided  assistance  crucial to getting
reconstruction under way. The programme has permitted
the provision of equipment for schools, buses, tractors'
agricultural inputs, equipment for the electricity sector
erc. This programme  was the first major response  from a
member  of the international  community  to the problems
of reconstruction.
The  Commission  refocused the  equipment-supply
programme for several reasons. It became aware of the
aifficutt environment in which it  was operating: the
substantial risk of fraud, denounced  at the time by the
High Representative, the lack of transparency in the
*"n"g.-.nt  of aid and the risk that aid might not reach
its  intended recipients forced the Commission  to
centralise the programmes. At the time the politicalc 241t40 |_Erl Official Journal of the European  Communities 31,.7.98
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina  meant there was little
point decentralising the programme to the country's
authorities. In taking this decision,  the Commission was
defending the Cornmunity's  financial interests.  The
programme  has been refocused on fewer sectors.
2.4. Given the constraints on creating new posts, the
Commission  has redeployed  staff to reinforce the teams
managing this assistance. These measures have had the
following results:
-  A Z2-member  tearn was ser up at Sarajevo office in
late 1996, some seven months after its opening. It
comprises 4 A grades (including the head of the
office), 1 B grade, 1 C grade and 'l,6local staff, seven
of them expatriates.  The Comrnission  then seconded
an A-grade official to the administration  in Mostar
(EUAM) to close the accounts for the EU's activities
(ECU 200 million) and assigned another A-grade
official to the OHR.
-  In  1996 a  new unit, DG IA-D-l, 'Bosnia and
Herzegovina and  reconstruction,  including
international  coordination,  horizontal aspects,
multi-country  programrnes for former Yugoslavia',
was set up in Brussels.  At the end of 1997 this unit
had a staff of 21, two-thirds of them assigned to
former Yugoslavia.
As far as external technical expertise is concern ed, 1,998
is the first budgetary year for which the Commission is
authorised to  use operational credits for  technical
support for programme implementation, to a maximum
of 2-3.5 "/" of programme  costs. This contrasts with other
donors such as USAID who may go above 15 % for
similar types of expenditure.
2.5. The 1,996 budget, published on 29 January 1996,
includes three headings  specifically for assistance  to
former Yugoslavia.  Pending a Iegal basis, the Cornmission
was authorised to use ECU 7 million of the appropriation
for heading  B7-5 4l,  the remaining ECU 20 million
being held in reserve. The use of the ECU 20 million was
subsequently authorised in  the framework of  the
trialogue. In April 1996 the Commission  presented a
draft Regulation for the reconsrruction headings; it did
not enter into force undl 14 August  1996. In the course
of  discussions, the Commission proposal underwent
major amendments, notably the addition of an annex on
the award of contracts based on the TACIS Regulation
and wholly unsuited to the situation in Bosnia. In July
1.997, i. e. the earliest  date at which the Regulation could
be amended,  the Commission submitted  an amendment
to  that annex. The Council retained the original
arrangements and accepted few of the Commission's
proposals. The Commission submitted  another proposal
substantially amending the Regulation in January this
year. This time the Council and Parliament took on
board the major criticisms of Community action in
former Yugoslavia and went along with the broad thrust
of the Commission  proposal.
2.6. The Commission  is required to work with UNHCR
in the case of refugees since the Dayton Agreement
assigned a mandate to UNHCR specifically for this
purpose.  Considerable  problems  were encountered  during
discussions with the UNHCR  on the EC contribution ro
housing projects implemented by NGOs through the
UNHCR. The conditions under which the UNHCR
wished to receive EC contributions  were, in some aspects,
contrary to the requirements  of the Financial Regulation
and lacking in transparency.
2.7. The Commission's mine-clearance  programme  has
trained both instructors and rnine-clearers. It  has
provided  equipment and cleared rnines from many areas
to permit both the return of refugees and the execution
of large-scale infrastructure works. This scheme has been
carried out in close coordination with the international
and local institutions,  and the Comrnission  has taken
great care to avoid being caught  up in the shady business
dealings for which this sector is notorious. Some delays
are attributable to the care with which the proposals
submitted  were analysed. Currently, the Commission  is
financing, in coordination with the BiH Mine Action
Centre, a programme  aimed at developing civil defence
capacities in the sphere of mine-clearance. The main
advantage  of this scheme is that it  addresses  local
mine-clearance capacities and thereby increases  the speed
and effectiveness of the operation. The commitment of
the appropriations  for  L997 has been delayed by
difficulties in  the  negotiations with  the  Bosnian
authorities.  Planned for 1997, these funds were carried
over to 1.998 and committed on 26 March,  enabling  a
contract to be signed between the Director-General  of
DG IA and the prime ministers of the Federation  and the
Republika Srpska.
2.8. Through the Essential Aid Programme  tn 1996 and
the reconstruction  programmes in 1996 and 1997, the
Commission  has repaired a total of 13 030 housing units
allowing by the end of the programme period the return3L.7.98 t ENI Official Journal of the European Communities c 241.t41,
of more than 50 000 persons
displaced) in Bosnia.
(refugees  and internally
The return of refugees and displaced persons  does not
depend solely on the availability of housing. There are
numerous  variables which influence when a family will
return to its repaired home, including the availability  of a
job, education facilities, and a reluctance to return to
rural areas because of changing social attitudes. The
policy followed by the Commission  is based on voluntary
return and respects the stringent conditions of  the
Dayton Agreement  which require return to the original
location of the familv.
2.10. A number of actions in the energy sector have had
some success  such as:
- 
the delivery of equipment to coal mines which has
helped increase  production  by 30 %',
- 
the delivery of coal and other inputs to electricity
production rvhich has helped rnake power cuts in
Sarajevo largely a thing of the past,
- 
the distribution of gas in Sarajevo has helped  restore
supplies to 3 800 families and electricity  supplies in
Tuzla have helped 20 000 people.
2.1,1.. The short term objective of transport  actions  was
not to influence refugee return but to restore basic
transport services, in particular in Sarajevo.  This has been
successful. Effects on refugee return will only occur in the
longer term.
2.1,2. The two sectors mentioned demanded  careful
analysis before taking action. Though agriculture initially
received no major funding, the situation  has changed
considerably  in  1,997 and, especially, 1998. The
convincing  results referred to by the Court have been
achieved by thoroughly preparing  viable projects (with
the assistance of a project coordination unit that had
already shown its mettle with the World Bank) in a now
stable environment.  For its part, the industrial  sector had,
with a few exceptions, to be completely reorganised
before it could benefit from assistance programmes.
2.L3. It  would have been unrealistic to embark on
massive public administration prograrnmes before the
basic institutions, and particular those provided for in the
Dayton Agreement, were in place. At the end of last year,
the Commission,  working closely with the OHR,
approved support programrnes  drawn up over the year,
for introduction in the course of this year, to strengthen
the Central Bank, the Ombudsman, the Human Rights
Commission and the Constitutional  Court.
3. DESIGN AND  IMPLEMENTATION OF  AID
PROGRAMMES
Commission strategy
Planning of DG IA measures
3.3. In autumn 1,995 the Commission  published  four
communications  announcing a comprehensive  strategy.
This strategy is  taken up  in  the  reconstruction
programme drawn up by the Commission  and the'World
Bank. They submitted the programme  to different donors
at three international  conferences,  obtaining the approval
of  the  international community. Each year the
Commission draws up guidelines for the strategy's
irnplementation. These guidelines are then translated  into
sectoral programmes comprising a series of integrated
projects, notably for  refugees. The Memoranda  of
Understanding  signed with the Bosnian authorities for the
1996 and 1,997 programmes also provide an overall
framework for  the  irnplementation of  those
programmes.
This budget effort was the subiect of a report to the
Council, which noted its main conclusions at the general
affairs meeting of 29 April 1,997.
3.4. The European Commission  was entrusted with the
management of the largest donor contribution  for Bosnia.
The first allocations of funds rn 1996 reflected the urgent
needs affecting a wide range of sectors, but also the
limited absorption capacity of the individual sectors.  The
EAP focused on the ten key sectors most affected by the
war. In addition, the weaknesses of the institutional
set-up as well as non reliable local counterparts obliged
the Commission to intervene  in different  fields.
The second largest donor, the 'World Bank, also covered
a wide range of sectors and activities.
For the L997 allocations, a more systematic programming
approach  has been developed with priorities  based on the
objectives set by the international community and the
Member  States as agreed in the conclusions  of the Peace
Implementation Conferences and Steering Boards and
within the Council  meetings.c 241,142 tEN I Official Journal of the European  Communities 31.7.98
3.5. The EAP was the Cornmunity's response to the
reconstruction  programme  drawn up by the Commission
and the lforld Bank with the backing  of the IMF, which
was approved  by the international community at the first
donor conference in L995.
The Comrnission  refocused the EAP for several reasons.
It became aware of the difficult environment  in which the
programme was operating: the substantial risk of fraud,
denounced at the time by the High Representative,  the
lack of transparency  in the management of aid and the
risk that aid might not reach its intended recipients
forced the Commission  to centralise the programmes.  At
the time the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
meant there was litle point decentralising the programme
to the country's  authorities. In taking this decision, the
Commission was defending the Comrnunity's  financial
interests.  The prograrnrne  has been refocused on fewer
sectors.
3.7. It  would have been unrealistic to  embark on
large-scale institutional support prograrnmes before the
basic institutions, and particular those provided for in the
Dayton Agreement,  were in place. It was not until the
Quick Start Package of  autumn 1996 that  the
international cornmunity started taking a more systematic
approach. The Commission  has been given responsibility
for everything relating to foreign trade and the central
banking system. Its assistance has been swift and
successful. Such has been its success that it has been
asked to extend its assistance to the sphere of taxation
(CAFAO) and cornmercial banking (training scheme), and
other donors dealing with the commercial law have
sought its help. The Cornmission  has also been asked by
the High Representative  to handle assistance for the
organisation  of the main institutions of State (Parliament,
the Presidency, Council of Ministers, and Ministers of
State). This assistance has been in place since autumn last
year. The Commission  is also helping the Central  Bank
and other Dayton institutions, e.g. the Ombudsman,  the
Human Rights Commission and the Constitutional
Court. Last but not least, the Commission  has, since the
start of the year, been identifying  each entity's needs in
the matter of reorganising  the judicial system.
Since December 1996 the Commission has been
developing  an action plan in support of health reforms.
This inter-DG  strategy is being implemented  this year.
The safe and orderly return of the many refugees and
displaced persons calls for a large number of schemes
aimed at  establishing adequate safety, rehabilitating
housing and basic infrastructure,  restoring health,  social
and education  services for  all  groups, including
minorities, and launching  economic activities permitting
the reintegration of refugees into the economic  and social
fabric. It is difficult, in such conditions, to distinguish
clearly between return programmes and other aid
activities. Only a combination  of such schemes can have
any lasting, beneficial impact on return. Given that the
return of refugees and displaced  persons is so complex,
the Commission  has sought to use every means available
to pfomote that process.
To bring the reconstruction process under way, the
Commission has developed ^ 
large-scale  programme
(ECU 125 million) to deliver the equipment and supplies
necessary to  relaunch vital sectors of  an economy
wrecked by war. This activity was better handled by
DG IA, which already had some experience of supplying
goods to the Caucasus, Macedonia and Albania and
standardised procedures developed for  Phare/TACIS.
Note also that the Community's  effort to assist Bosnia's
reconstruction, coupled with the overriding wish to
maintain the peace, is  a  new experience for  the
Commission and the other donors: it was inevitable that
the instruments used would have to be adapted to
circumstances.
Within the Commission, DG IA's programmes were
geared more to infrastructure,  institutional  support and
the rehabilitation  of housing, while ECHO sought to
support social and vital infrastructure  (health, education,
emergency rehabilitation).
During the programme's crucial start-up phase, the
activities of Cornmission departments were coordinated
by an interdepartmental  working party chaired by the
Deputy Director-General of DG IA. ECHO, DG XXI (for
CAFAO) and  other departrnents were involved
throughout  this exercise.
This formal coordination was backed up by numerous
informal and operational contacts between departments.
Support for refugees  was
executing  the budget for
and remains the first priority
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
tn
3.8. The Comrnission
refugees decided in
fully executed
1,996 by the
the budget line for
budget authority.3r.7.98 TEN I Official Journal of the European  Communities c 241t43
3.9. The donors' programme involved a division of
labour. The EBRD, for example,  handled  the energy and
telecommunications  sectors, while the World Bank dealt
with transport and water. The Commission  was involved
in a number of sectors in coordination with the other
donors. For example, it handled the reconstruction of the
telecommunications system which restored  connections
between the Republika Srpsk a and the Federation last
September (cf. 3.30.).
Planning of ECHO measures
3.10. Although the Commission has announced an
envelope of ECU 1 billion for reconstruction for the
period 1,996-1999, budget execution takes place with in
an annual  framework.
3.11. In view of the continuing humanitarian  needs in
Bosnia, the Commission  has decided to  maintain
substantial humanitarian aid alongside reconstruction
assistance. These activities ^re 
coordinated by the
interdepartmental working party and informal  contacts
(cf. 3.8.).
3.1,2. ECHO's activities in the housing  sector were
limited in 1996, the main operation being a pilot project
set up by the UNHCR. It was not until last year, after a
request of the High Representative, that ECHO really got
involved in this sector.
Organisation of DG IA dePartments
3.13. Given the constraints on creating new posts, the
Commission  has redeployed  staff to reinforce the teams
managing this assistance.  These measures have had the
following results:
-  A 22-rnember  team was set up at Sarajevo office in
late 1.996, sorne seven months after its opening. It
comprises 4 A  grades (including  the head of the
office), 1 B grade,  1 C grade and 1.6 local staff, seven
of them expatriates.  The Commission then seconded
an A-grade official to the administration in Mostar
(EUAM) to close the accounts for the EU's activities
(ECU 200 million) and assigned another A-grade
official to the OHR.
-  In  1996 a new unit, DG IA-D-l, 'Bosnia and
Herzegovina  and  reconstruction,  including
international coordination, horizontal aspects,
multi-country programmes for former Yugoslavia',
was set up in Brussels.  At the end of 1997 this unit
had a staff of 21, two-thirds  of them assigned to
former Yugoslavia.
As far as external technical expertise is concerned,  1998
is the first budgetary year for which the Commission is
authorised  to  use operational credits for  technical
support for programme implementation, to a maximurn
of 2-3.5 "/" of programme  costs. This contrasts with other
donors such as USAID who may go above 1,5 % for
similar  types of expenditure.
For 1998, the Commission has decided to devolve the
implementation of Community assistance to staff in
Bosnia. The Delegation, and in particular its head, are
going to be given greater powers. It is also going to
increase staffing at its offices in various Bosnian towns
outside Sarajevo,  and thus its presence on the ground,
especially in Banja Luka and Mostar.
For the first time in the 1998 budget there are allocations
for ex-Yugoslavia followed by a comment which allows
the Commission to use operational  funds for technical
support purposes - 
up to 2 "/" for Phare and 3,5 "/" for
Reconstruction,  otherwise known as the STAP facility.
This facility will help in part to resolve some of the
human resources problems the Commission  faces.
However, it contrasts with USAID which benefits from
over 15 7o support for similar  expenditure.
3.1.4.-3.1.5.  The Commission  has decided to increase  the
size of the Delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
staff selected will take up their duties this spring. The
Commission will then have 21 A-grade staff in Bosnia
and Herzegovina  (10 officials and LL local technical
assistance staff) and 10 C-grade staff, three of them
officials.  In total, the Delegation will have a staff of 36,
17 of thern officials. It is also launching an invitation to
tender to set up, in Bosnia, a technical  assistance unit to
prepare  and supervise projects under its control.
3.1,6. The EAP in Bosnia was launched under extreme
conditions. Given the importance and amount of the
financial assistance involved, the need to ensure adequate
control, and the extremely complex situation following
the armed conflict, a visible and operational presence of
the Commission  was considered essential to assist the
implementation of the programme.
The EC Office in Sarajevo in the
technical  office which was opened
first half of 1.996 was a
primarily to implementc 24U44 tEN-l Official Journal of the European Communities 31,.7.98
the Essential Aid Prograrnme. The staffing comprised
technical and external  experts and it  was therefore
justified to use operational  credits for this purpose. At
that time the Commission  could not use credits from Part
A  of  the Budget as the decision to  establish  a
Cornmission  Delegation in Saraievo was not taken until
24 Apri| 1,996.
Running costs relating to the functioning of the office
were progressively  absorbed  as the official Commission
presence in Sarajevo  was consolidated.  This was achieved
firstly through an advance account and then an imprest
account. The two major running costs of office rent and
staff salaries  were rnet using credits frorn Title A6 of the
EC budget with effect from June and November 1996
respectively. However, the availability of extra credits in
Part A of the Budget would have made the Cornmission's
task easier.
3.17 .  The specific situation of Eastern Slavonia has to be
taken into consideration  in order to understand the
decisions taken in  the  implementarion of  the
Commission's  proiects. The region was under the control
of UNTAES  whose mandate expired 15 January 1998,
the date of the full reintegration of the region to Croatia.
During this period UNTAES was the institution in charge
of  the administration, and was the only official
counterpart to the Commission.  However, given that
UNTAES had no legal statute it was not possible to
formalise an agreement with the Commission.
Therefore,  given its overall personnel constraints,  the
Commission  had recourse to the procedures described by
the Court in order to ensure an adequate level of staffing
and administration  on the spot of the funds concerned.
This has enabled the Commission  to speed up the
mobilisation of Communiw  aid.
3.18. The Comrnission is  actively involved in  the
Economic Task Force coordinating the  overall
reconstruction process. It is also actively involved in the
sectoral working parties, especially in sectors  receiving
Community financing,  which it has asked the IMG to
chair in  view of  its  technical know-how and
understanding  of the needs.
3.19. In order to respond quickly to the emergency
situation arising after the end of  the conflicts in
Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the Commission  implemented  the
EAP using a sub-contracted  arrangement.  However,  the
difficulties  described in 3.5 led the Commission to stop
the programme and centralise its managernent.  At the
time, the situation in Bosnia, a country emerging from a
war with a weak, complex and barely functioning
government  apparatus, in transition  from Cornmunism
system to a 'W'estern-style dernocracy, did not seem to
offer the Commission the guarantees  necessary for the
decentralised implementation of Community  aid.
It is in full awareness  of all the risks that the Commission
has opted to  centralise the  managernent of  its
programmes. Its experience of the EAP bears out its
judgement. The Commission  deliberately  chose not to
create PMU-type  structures in Bosnia: their proliferation
in some Phare countries has attracted criticism and they
are currently  being rationalised.
As a result of subsequent  improvement  in the political
structures and the establishment of  more reliable
institutions in Bosnia Herzegovina, the Commission  is
preparing from spring 1998 to deconcentrate certain
functions by transferring resources to  its office in
Sarajevo.  (see the remarks in 3.13.-3.15.).
3.20.-3.21,.  As stated in 3.13.-3.L5.,  the Commission is
taking steps to  deconcentrate  implemerrtation by
reinforcing  its office in Saraievo.
In addition, the Commission, together with the Bosnian
Ministry of  Agriculture,  \fater  and Forestry,  has
developed an approach not to create PMUs but to
reinforce the administrative capacity of some public
institutions:
- 
In the water sector, a Proiect Coordination Unit was
formally established in October 1997 to offer an
interface  between the Commission  and the relevant
ministry in  the Federation in  identifying and
implementing  the projects. The role of the unit is
limited to the technical management of the projects.
- 
More recently, the Commission agreed at the end of
1997 to fund the Agriculture  Implementation Unit
supported to date by the 'World 
Bank.
Given the difficulties  in the region, there was no question
setting up PMUs in the ministries during the start-up
phase (cf. 3.19).
The Cornmission  is no
international  aid than the
less involved in coordinating 'World 
Bank.
3.22. The measures taken to
the Delegation are described
strengthen  the capacity of
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the Commission  is putting in place a technical assistance
unit on the ground, and an audit facility.
As far as the Mostar programme was concerned,  almost
all staff in the city were provided  by Member  States at
little or  no cost to  the Community budget. The
Commission  detached an official to Mostar and provided
support for  technical  assistance. The  costs of
administering the action were met from the operational
budget in  accordance with the Joint Action. These
arrangements  are more generous  than those permitted
under existing legislation for the reconstruction or Phare
budget lines.
3.23. The Head of EC CAFAO  consults with the
management in DG XXI on a quasi-daily basis and
reports regularly to  the  President of  the
inter-departmental  group. This line of command allows a
decentralised  system to work without losing control of
the operation. The effectiveness of the EC CAFAO
operation in  terms of  organisation and financial
management  relies on  back-up and support from
Brussels, be it  management guidance, organising the
supply of the international staff, the purchase of the
necessary equipment, the management of the funds with
the procurement  agent, the control of the local budget of
CAFAO etc.
3,24. The rWorld Bank and USAID (up to 15 % of
programme costs) benefit from greater flexibility in the
financial arrangements applying to  programme
management  costs than the Budgetary Authority which
has, on an exceptional basis, permitted. the Commission
to use 2-3.5 "/" of programme  costs. USAID benefits from
the possibility to  conclude addenda to  contracts
exceeding several million ecus without formal tendering
procedures (e,g. operating costs of  their office in
Sarajevo).
3.25. The Comrnission appointed a new Director for
Ex-Yugoslavia  on 1 November 1,997. In addition, a
Special Advisor with  specific responsibility for
coordinating aid on the spot in Bosnia as well as in
Brussels was appointed on 1 December  1997.
Organisation of ECHO departments
3.26. Given the particular nature of humanitarian  aid,
the consultants  recruited for ECHO missions on the
ground are employed  on renewable  six-month  contracts.
Since it takes about six weeks to prepare such contracts,
the managers  of offices on the ground are asked two
months before contracts  expire whether renewal is
recommended  and whether consultants wish ro continue
their missions.
3.27. To  enhance operational efficiencl,,  ECHO is
currently considering  the scope for decentralising  some of
its  contracting and payment procedures. ECHO
Bosnia-Herzegovina  has, since 1996, been able to manage
projects up to a limit of ECU 42 000.
However, consultation of headquarters remains necessary
for the purposes of managing contracts. 'Without such
consultation,  headquarters  would find it  difficult  to
monitor the proper conduct of operations in the field.
Such decentralisation  would also appreciably  increase the
costs of technical assistance.  Should it nevertheless take
place, the Commission  would need more staff to enable it
to send humanitarian  specialists into the field.
Programme  implementation
Rate of utilisation of appropriations
3.29. Much as the Commission would have liked it to,
the EIB's statutes prevented its involvement  in the process
because of a Bosnian debt connected  with the pre-war
debt to the EIB. In May the Commission  will be putting
proposals to the Council aimed at enabling the EIB to
play its part.
3.30. The Court seeks to draw comparisons between
actions financed  by the Commission  and those funded by
other donors.  Such a comparison, however, neglects to
note that other donors implement actions of a very
different  nature.
For example, the 'World Bank provides its support
essentially through loans. Managing a loan scheme differs
significantly from a grant r6gime such as the one
provided b1, the Commission. Grants are provided with
no guarantee other than the political commitment of the
beneficiar,v. In order to protect public funds, controls on
the disbursement of grants are therefore much more
complex and slower than those for loans. In contrast to
this situation, loans are repayable and guaranteed by the
beneficiary  state. Their repayments are credited to the
balance sheet of the bank. Political conditionality is less
of  a  constraint. In  spite of  this handicap, the'a
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disbursement performance  of grants provided by the
Comrnission  and the loans of the '!florld Bank is broadly
similar.
As far as USAID is concerned,  a substantial component
of the assistance they provided was in the form of credit
lines to  small businesses,, agarn with more rapid
disbursement  rates. The decision-making procedures
applying to USAID are also markedly more simple than
in  the case of  the European Union, where the
Commission had to operate under a Regulation  with
much stricter public procurement rules. Indeed,  the
Reconstruction Regulation  imposed by Council was in
fact a simple transposition of the TACIS  Regulation,
quite unsuited to the situation in Bosnia. In contrast to
the United States, which worked initially mainly where
their troops are based, European  Union aid initially
comprised both entities. Aid to the Republika Srpska  was
suspended first in 1,996 and then in "1,997 because of the
requirements of the Dayton  Agreement, and this also
slowed down disbursement.
3.32. The Commission's  mine-clearance programme has
trained both instructors and mine-clearers. It  has
provided equipment  and cleared mines from many areas
to perrnit both the return of refugees and the execution
of large-scale  infrastructure works. This scheme has been
carried out in close coordination  with the international
and local institutions, and the Commission  has taken
gteat care to avoid being caught up in the shady business
dealings for which this sector is notorious.  Some delays
are attributable to the care with which the proposals
submitted were analysed. Currently, the Commission is
financing, in coordination with the BiH Mine Action
Centre, a programme aimed at developing civil defence
capacities in the sphere of mine-clearance.  The main
advantage of this scheme is that it  addresses  local
mine-clearance capacities and thereby  increases the speed
and effectiveness of the operation.  The cornmitment  of
the appropriations for  1.997 has been delayed  by
difficulties in  the negotiations with  the  Bosnian
authorities. Planned for 1.997, these funds were carried
over to 1.998 and committed  on 26 March, enabling  a
contract to be signed between the Director-General  of
DG IA and the prime ministers  of the Federation  and the
Republika Srpska.
Proiect  preparation
3.33. The measures described in 3.13.-3.L5 and 3.22.
are designed to improve the situation of Cornrnission
services on the ground in Sarajevo.
3.34. The IMG was created at the initiative of the
Commission. It  has consistently been used by the
Cornmission  in the preparation of the programmes  in the
sectors where they have a real expertise such as to
identify projects and means of implementation (SRSA,
among others, was identified by the IMG as a suitable
NGO for Gorazde).
The IMG is, however,  only involved in certain sectors
(energy, housing,  transport and water). It is therefore
unable to  help the Commission in  sectors such as
education, health,  agriculture or  institutional
development.
3.35. At  the NGO meeting in  January 1998 the
expectations and requirements of the Commission were
fully explained.  The Commission  presented a detailed
document  of over 400 pages setting out clear instructions
on drawing up proposals. The proposals received,
representing about 200 projects,  have been examined  and
evaluated on the basis of  pre-established  technical
criteria.  The Court's description of this exercise as being
'NGO demand-driven'  fails to take account of these
factors.
In the humanitarian field, the Commission supervises
NGOs and their activities through its  on-the-spot
technical assistance  staff, who enable ECHO to play an
active role and keep the initiative in its partnership with
the NGOs in the field. ECHO also makes frequent visits
to its partners' headquarters to check their administrative
and financial capacities and the accuracy of data in their
descriptive and financial reports. Last but not least,
ECHO also evaluates proiects and/or progranlmes.
Contracting
3.36. The existence of two separate Regulations  reflects
the Budgetary Authority's  decision in 1,996 to create a
new line specifically for reconstruction, for which a legal
base is necessary.  In 1995, the budget allocation having
been established, Phare seemed to be the only instrurnent
available.
3.37. The  derogations from  standard  procedures
introduced in the EAP enabled the Commission to speed
up the implementation of the programme in response to
an urgent situation.
3.39. The Commission  has launched  a financial  audit of
the EAP and will address  the points raised by the Court
concerning the Procurement Agents in that context. As
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a)  Short-lists  of suppliers drawn up by the Procurement
Agents (PAs) were based on a register  collected through
an open call for expressions  of interest  issued by the
Conrmission.  The register gathered a total of  1 692
potential  suppliers  (from 14 EU and 11 Phare countries)
covering  all eight sectors of EAP.
c)  In a Bosnia emerging from war and where there was
still a considerable risk of instability, it  is easy to
understand  why the lowest bids sometimes exceeded  the
sum initially allocated  for the operations.
d)  The terms of reference for contracts between the
Commission  and procurernent  agencies were very precise
with regard to the procedures  governing  equipment
purchases. In some cases the Commission  authorised
derogations  from the normal  deadlines laid down by the
Phare rules to respond to the urgency of the situation.
g)  The Commission took care in checking lengths of
short-lists and provided statistics on their geographical
distributions  among Member  States.
Complaints were received from some Member States
pointing out that the number of contracts  awarded to
their respective  national manufacturers  did not reflect the
level of their contribution to the EU budget. These
remarks conflict with the need for  a  completely
independent approach to  managing the  EAP
pfogfamme.
3.40. As laid down in Regulation 1628196,  the Phare
countries  enjoy access to contracts on an exceptional
basis. This differentiation was imposed on  the
Comrnission  by the legislative  authoriry.
3.41. Contrary to  the  initial  proposal of  the
Commission,  the Council imposed  stricter ceilings on
more flexible procurement  procedures  in particular for
supplies and works contracts.
3.42. In view of the circumstances,  the use of NGOs
helped cut costs, speed up procedures and manage a
large-scale  operation more effectively.
A standardised  form for completion by the manager is
now an integral part of the dossier.
3.43. Rules governing sub-contracting were amended in
the August 1,997 vade-mecum following the Court's
comments on this aspect.
3.45. The scale used by ECHO to cover the costs of
local staff will shortly be updated,  notably in view of the
failure of  fees to  reflect current conditions in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
ECHO's  procedures for  preparing contracts for
rehabilitation in Bosnia-Herzegovina  require the partner
to draw up a preliminary specifications  for approval  by
the  IMG  and ECHO Bosnia-Herzegovina before
contracts are drawn up and signed. These specifications
cannot be included in the contract because they generally
undergo many changes in the course of works, If they
were included, each change would require  the contract to
be amended, generating a considerable amount of red
tape.
The duration of the guarantee is agreed between the firm
carrying out the works and the recipient of the project.
At the end of each project, the NGO, the construction
firm and a representative of the recipient, often the local
council, carry out a joint inspection,  at the end of which
the recipient usually accepts the works and takes
possession of the building. ECHO Bosnia-Herzegovina
also asks the IMG to carry out the final inspection of
works before approving the final payment, which in
ECHO's  case is always 20 %.
Payments
3.46.-3.48.  It may be possible for advance payments to
be made directly by the financial unit of  DG IA.
However,  this would need to be clearly specified in the
contract. The Commission  will examine the feasibility of
this procedure.  Requests for normal payments should
continue to be sent to the operational  services in order
that the service rendered can be verified and the request
endorsed 'Conforme  aux faits, bon i  payef , as required
by the Financial Regulation. The setting up of a local
payrnents  system on-the-spot to accelerate procedures  is
envisaged.
3.47. A standard format for a
been developed and is annexed
bank guarantee has now
to each contract.
Nevertheless, whatever their format, many bank
guarantees have to be returned to the contractors for the
following reasonsl
1,. The date of validitv on the bank guarantee  is
incorrect: it does not comply with the general conditions
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2. The bank account  mentioned on the bank guarantee
(which directly affects the validity of this guarantee) and
the bank account on the contractor's request for payment
do not tally. The Commission  cannot execute such a
payment without  undermining the bank guarantee.  This
is therefore  a question of substance  rather than of form.
3.49. The decision to repair the Parliament and the
choice of the parts to be repaired were put forward  by
the OHR and the World Bank. The project had already
been appraised and invitations  to tender prepared  when
the Commission's  financial support was sought. The
Commission  could have refused to take part because the
new invitations to tender it had to launch under its own
procedures  meant there was no way it could meet the
deadlines. Given the absence of other funds and the
political importance of rebuilding the Parliament,  the
Cornmission pledged its backing  for the works requested,
which did not include the main chamber.
The Director-General  of DG IA visited the site on 3 April
after consulting  the High Representative.  The project
plays a strategic role in the international communiry's
efforts to bring together the central authorities  and the
Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina  in these premises. All
concerned on the spot confirrn the redundancy  of the old
chamber in view of the availability of suitable smaller
meeting rooms.
Proiect monitoring  and eualuation
3.51. For the EAP programme,  Technitas were given rhe
specific task of monitoring. The role of the Programme
Officers was therefore  to accompany the programme on
the ground in close liaison with the Task Manager  in
Brussels who retains responsibility  for  the overall
monitoring.
For  the  reconstruction programme,  rnonitoring
arrangements exist for the sectors of housing  (since
mid-1,997),  water (since October 1997) and (since
December 1997) agriculture.  A more sysremaric  approach
will draw upon the budget remarks of the Ex-Yugoslavia
lines in the 1,998 budget which allows for a proportion of
the operational credits to be used for technical supporr
purposes. Part of these credits are to be used for
monitoring  purposes.
3.52. A draft evaluation report will be sent to the Court
when it becomes  available in May,
3.53. a)  The Commission is  in  the  process of
developing  arrangernents with  Bosnian authorities
concerning the utilisation of  the counterpart funds
generated by the repayments of the loans made under the
Phare moto-cultivators  project.
In line with the 1998 Agriculture Financial Proposal,  an
umbrella organisation  will be created to both provide
seed capital and credit facilities in rural areas and
coordinate the management of the counterpart funds.
Priority support will be given to those initiatives that
generate employment  in rural areas and process local
produce.
b)  The payment  system is based on cash-flow estimates.
The Commission cannot estimate the operating funding
needed until projects  have become operational (i. e. at the
time of the first interim payments  and after the payment
of advances).
c)  The financial accounts will be consolidated just
before the closure of the accounts for the special funds.
3.54. All projects are currently supervised  by technical
agencies (IMG, specialist contractors etc.).
3.55. b)  The  Council repeatedly requested the
Commission  to fund the UNHCR in the case of refugees
since the Dayton Agreernent  assigned a mandate to
LINHCR specifically  for  this purpose. Considerable
problems were encountered during discussions with the
UNHCR on the EC contribution to housing projects
implemented by NGOs through the UNHCR.  The
conditions under which the UNHCR wished to receive
EC contributions were, in sorne aspects, contrary to the
requirements of the Financial  Regulation and lacking in
transparency.
c)  Since May last year every ECHO contract with the
UNHCR has included a clause requiring'sub-agreements'
to be transmitted to ECHO.
4. IMPACT
Geographical  distribution
Entities constituting  B osnia-Herze gouina
Una Sana (Federation)
4.4. 'Whilst Una Sana is a priority case for returning
refugees,  the Commission  has never subscribed to thea
,
31,.7.98 I-TNI Official Journal of the European Communities c 241,149
plan proposed by the Federation authorities  because of
certain shortcomings  in  the proposal. When the
Commission proposed to include other elements (e.g.
social infrastructure  and repairs to basic infrastructure)
considered essential  to encourage refugees to return, this
was not accepted by the Federation  authorities which led
to  delays in  the  negotiations. Nevertheless,  the
Commission  continued to fund programmes  in Una Sana
independently of  the proposal made by the local
authorities.  There is also an agricultural project worth
over ECU 2  million which represents a  significant
contribution to this sector.
A study was sought after the Commission  received many
plans and requests for funding in the Una Sana area. The
study gave a clearer picture of the huge needs in this
canton and constituted the basis of further planning  for
the region. This includes the ECU 141, million Refugee
programme lor 1998 and for which a Refugee Workshop
was held in January 1998 to brief and prepare the main
players likely to be responsible for the programme's
implernentation. Part of this programme will be destined
for Una Sana.
Brcko (Republika  Srpska ) '
4.3.-4.5.  The return programme also enabled a number
of projects to be financed in Brcko.
Croatia
4.6. An initial presence  was established by UNTAES  in
the Vukovar area during the 1st semester  of 1,996. The
initial decision for the 1996 programme,  made against  a
background of political pressure to begin reconstruction
measures, was based upon the limited information
available during the early period of the presence in the
area, Once the Commission's implementing  agency was
more firmly established it became evident that changes to
the programme were required to more closely align the
constituent  elernents with the reconstruction  needs and
political requirements  of the area. To have done nothing
pending  clear identification of the exact needs would
have seriously delayed the Commission's (and hence
EU's) response to the area's needs, an option considered
to be politically unacceptable.
Sectoral distribution
Housing and refugee return
4.10.-4.1,1,.  The rehabilitation of housing depended  on
the availability  of budget resources,  which was itself
contingent on the trialogue  (see 2.5) and the adoption of
reconstruction Regulation. As a result, proiects could not
begin until autumn 1.996. In order to further accentuate
the return of  refugees and displaced persons, the
Commission organised  on January 23 1,998 a workshop
with NGOs in order to launch a comprehensive  return
programme  financed from the 1998 budget. Following
this workshop attended by more than 200 NGOs, the
Commission  decided on March 27 to develop a ECU 141
million prograrnme including an ECU 105 rnillion
housing programme allowing the rehabilitation of 5 000
houses. This programrne  is now under implementation. A
first tranche of ECU 63 million for rehabilitation  of
houses  has already been launched and contracts  were
signed in Sarajevo  with 23 NGOs on April 3. The repairs
are going to  be  implemented during the  1998
reconstruction period (mainly during spring and summer)
and will be achieved  before the winter period. The
programme foresees the return of 20 000 additional
persons in 1.998. A second tranche is ready and will be
launched as soon as the budget earmarked  for it  is
available  (i. e. when the ECU 30 million reserve placed in
the 1,998 Budget is lifted). Projects  are selected  and
contracts are ready.
4.1,3. a)  Gorazde: The  Commission  asked the
procurement agent Italtrend to  recover the amount
overpaid to SRSA for works not carried out, an amount
calculated by an outside auditor at DM 787 384. The
Commission  has recently concluded  that SRSA, unable to
recover advances paid to its subcontractor Bosna Auto,
was unable to repay the sum and was now contesting the
validity of the audit. The Commission is now studying
the possibility  of legal action.
c)  The Stolac pilot project was very difficult to
implement  because of the great tension between  Croats
and Bosnians in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Progress
has nevertheless  been made: the rehabilitation  of 95
houses was completed in March, and the owners have
since returned to 94 of them. Furthermore,  this pilot
project encouraged  many members of the minority to
return to Stolac of their own accord in March and
April.
4.14. It  has been impossible for the Commission  to
concentrate  only on refugees  because of the social unrest
this may cause in any given community. 'STithout the
return of displaced persons to their homes, there is little
chance of having refugees returning. The Commission  has
increasingly  used the following  breakdown for  its
reconstruction programrnes:  50 % for refugees returningI
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from the EU, 40 "/" for displaced persons and 10 "/" for
vulnerable  persons.
Through  the Essential Aid Programme  in 1996 and the
reconstruction programme in  1,996 and 1997, the
Commission  has repaired  a total of 13 030 housing units
allowing the return by the end of the programme period
of more than 50 000 persons (refugees and internally
displaced) in Bosnia.
4.1,6.-4.1,7.  The systern of loans developed with the KfW
could not be introduced  earlier because there was no
legal framework in Bosnia for such a scheme. Moreover,
the ownership of properties  is the subject of dispute,
which makes any system of rehabilitation loans difficult
and requires the Commission's support for properties.
Lastly, there was no reliable, unified banking  system in
Bosnia. In view of these factors, it would have been
difficult to  develop this  systern earlier without
endangering the rnanagement of European public funds.
Before this scheme was set up, the Commission had no
option but to accord grants for the rehabilitation  of
housing.
Promoting return cannot be likened to  aiding the
vulnerable. Return, if  it  is to  last, must focus on
comrnunities  and not on individuals selected according  to
social and economic  criteria. More generally, the
Cornmission has tried to encourage  the minority to return
wherever the start of a process of return is thought likely
to trigger wider, spontaneous  rnovements  of return, so
freeing accommodation currently occupied by displaced
persons and enabling  refugees to return from abroad.
4.1,8. The rate of occupancy  of hornes rehabilitated  by
the end of  1997 is 70 "/", slightly higher than the
UNHCR's estimates for  the donors as a  bodv
(60-6s %).
Note, however,  the following points:
-  The approach sometimes used for reconstruction
(self-help)  leaves owners free to complete the works
at their convenience,  which means that works are
sornetirnes finished after the contract with the NGO
has ended. This is not the case of houses repaired by
contractors (the other approach used), where the
beneficiary  receives a turnkey  home.
- 
Political and securitv issues also have to be taken into
account.
In 1,997 the Commission focused on social infrastructure
projects (Bihac hospital, rehabilitation of schools) to
flank the housing rehabilitation programme.
4.19. The reason that the repairs focused ,:n external
works and communal areas (except for Eastern Slavonia)
was because of the ownership/tenancy issues: this work
was designed to preserve the buildings  and enable their
use by their current occupants, rightful or not. 
.When
ownership ltenancy issues could be solved, repairs were
also carried out in the apartment itself: this is the case of
Vukovar through the Housing  Allocation  Committee. A
similar setting is currently being designed f,rr Sarajevo
with  a  joint  ECruS/OHR initiative.  The
ownership/tenancy  issues are instrumental  if  any
significant return to the cities is to be achieved.
Education
4.21.. The education programme of  the EAP has
significantly contributed to  reviving local industrial
production. SIP Konjuh, one of the largest furniture
manufacturers  in BiH before the war, was able to re-start
production, to specialise in furniture for schools (which
was not in its range of products), and to increase  its staff
from  384 in  1994 to  1,200 employees  today.
Furthermore,  the irnproved quality control irnposed by
EAP has contributed to make SIP Konjuh competitive on
the international market: this company exports by now
40 % of its production  world-wide.
The goods were distributed to schools by the Bosnian
authorities according to criteria of their own.
Health
4.24. In  October  1.997 the PHARE  Management
Committee  approved a Health Programme of ECU 5.7
million in support ol  among other actions, Primary
Health Care and Health Financing Reform and
Pharmaceutical  Sector Development. Three tenders  were
launched between December 1997 and January  1,998. lt
is presently foreseen that the first teams will be on the
ground in March-April 1998.
4.25. In Decernber  1,997, the BiH Council of Ministers
finally agreed on the location for the Laboratory  for
Quality Control: Sarajevo. Following  this decision,  ana
(
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action plan was agreed with the Federation Minister of
Health under which a re-assessment  of the contents and
objectives of the project will be undertaken  jointly by the
Commission  and the Federation  Ministrv of Health.
4.26. Cornmission services had  a  complementary
approach to action in the health sector. The projects of
ECHO were targeted towards the local level whereas
DG IA sought to intervene ar the entity level. This was
constrained  by institutional difficulties such as those
mentioned  in 4.25 of the Courr's report. Throughout  the
process the Commission  ensured close cooperation
between its services.
Energy (electricity and gas)
4.28.-4.29.  The effects of the EAP energy secor actions
include:
1,. Electricity distribution
- 
A successful inter-entity project between Gorazde and
Visegrad  has been carried out though the EAP.
-  In the Tuzla region,  electrical distribution  has been
secured to 20 000 people.
-  In  Odzak, 27 km of electrical lines have been
repaired.
2.  Thermal Power Plants
Power plants had not been affected directly by war
destruction, but rather by the lack of spare parts and
scarce supply of coal. The EAP contributed to supply
both.
The Kakanj power plant is now able to produce up to
40 % of its pre-war capacity and power cuts in Sarajevo
are largely a thing of the past. The city of Tuzla would
still be in darkness without  assistance from EAP.
3.  Gas
Pipes and regulators delivered under EAP (and installed
in cooperation with the World Bank) have provided  gas
to approximately 3 800 families in the Novi Grad area of
Sarajevo which had  suffered particularly severe
destruction.
The project included the supply of individual gas heaters
and cookers for each family partly to ensure revenues  to
Sarajevogas.
4.  Coal Mines
Iil(ith assistance of the equipment delivered by EAP, the
mine of Breza was able to increase its production  by
approximately  30 o/o, to 200 000 tons. The coal is
delivered to the Kakanj power plant. The mine is now
planning to reach a production of 500 - 
600 000 tons
in the near future and at the same time to increase  safety
conditions for the miners.
Impact is comparable in the coal mine of Tuzla, which
was able to start with a third shift of miners.
4.30. The first part of ECU 13,5 million has now been
contracted and is underway. Concerning  the second part
of ECU 7 million programme from budget hne B7-5 4 3,
the Commission waited for the remarks from the
beneficiaries  at the tender evaluation  stage in order to
avoid conflicts and cancellation of projects during the
implementation stage.
4.31. Responsibility for applying the Dayton Agreernent
lies with the Bosnia-Herzegovina  authorities,  under the
supervision of the High Representative. All main donors
followed the same approach regarding the three
Elektroprivreda-entities  in  line  with  the  Dayton
Agreement and with the full agreement of the High
Representative.
The allocation of the budget was decided as a result of
the urgent needs of the Elektroprivredas. Their aim is to
build on this and develop inter-entity  projects.
Transport
General remarks
4.33. Refugee  return ultimately  depends  on an improved
economic  environment. Investing in  transport
infrastructure plays a major role in the revival of the
economy.
B ri dges
4.35. A clear reason for the delay of this project is the
difficulties encountered  in trying to cooperate  with the
Bosnian  authorities. The completion date is now forecast
to be July-August  1999. Preparatory work prior to the
main repairs has proved beneficial. Preliminary
underwater investigations  have provided more precise
information on the state of the existing bridge and
enabled a rnore accurate estimate to be made of the cost
of the repairs.
Roads
4.36. The contract has now been awarded and was
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4.37. The projects in Republika Srpska were suspended
for political reasons.
4.38. Consultations were made directly with the road
maintenance units by  the Procurement  Agent to
determine their exact requirements.
In the case of the asphalt and crushing plants, the
specifications, in terms of capacity and performance,
were presented  by the road maintenance units to the
Procurement  Agent. However, the Cornmission was
unable to approve the request as the unit price far
exceeded  the available budget (by a factor of 5 times).
Instead, the Procurement Agent offered  alternative  mobile
plant, for which the unit price was within budget, but for
which the performance  and capacity  were much reduced.
This alternative was accepted by the road maintenance
units and the Ministry.
Civil aviation
4.40. The work on this project is scheduled to  be
completed in May 1998.
Despite  the delays, which were principally the result of
difficulties in cooperating with the local beneficiaries,
progress has been made. This has been achieved  using
funds from a variety of donors. The EU's contribution
has included  the civil aviation masterplan which has seen
the creation of a secretariat  representative for civil
aviation in Bosnia (3 entities).
'Water and domestic waste management
4.44. Following the study of the waste management
strategy for the Sarajevo  Canton, the Commission  has
earmarked  additional funding for the development  of a
waste strategy covering the entire State of Bosnia. This is
seen as a necessary pre-condition for the development  of
new projects in  the sector. Funding for  follow-up
initiatives will be considered under new programmes
developed in 1.998 in particular  for the Sarajevo landfill.
ECHO, in close cooperation with the NGOs, the local
authorities and the IMG, is now trying to remedy the
problems  raised by the Court.
Telecommunications
4.45. This success was achieved through funding
managed by the Commission in  spite of  political
difficulties encountered during the implementation of the
programme.
4.48. It is easier to bring political pressure  to bear in the
telecommunications sphere than in other sectors because
the network effect and the economies of scale are so
great. The Commission has used this means of political
pressure to  strengthen implementation  of the peace
agreements.
Agricuhure
4.49. Recognising  the key role agriculture  has to play,
two agricultural  programmes  of ECU 5 million each were
approved by the Phare Management Committee in May
and October 1,997. These programmes are supporting,
among other actions, the revamping of  agricultural
production  and the regeneration  of the livestock sector in
BiH. A follow-up agricultural programme for ECU 20
million has already been developed and was presented to
the Phare Management Committee in March 1'998.
4.51,. The L 300 motor cultivators delivered under EAP
have provided replacement for approximately  5 % of the
equipment  destroyed during the war, while the World
Bank covered a further 7,5 %. However the actual
impact is probably larger since the majority of cultivators
have been allocated to the most destitute  farmers  and
returnees. The impact of  small and medium-size
lactofreezers  is probably rather low in the short term
since livestock population had declined by 60 % during
the war. It  should  nevertheless  grow rapidly, and is
furthermore complementary  to the Commission's  long
term strategy for the sector, for  example, to  the
successful  delivery of cows under EAP.
4.52. A substantial  review of the project proposed  by
the NGO concerned  had to be undertaken bv the
Commission so as to  rnake it  consistent with the
objectives of the Comrnission's  own programme.  The
revised proposal from ARP was only received in March
1,997 and a contract signed by the Commission on 18
April 1,997 thus allowing the NGO to mobilise in May.
Similarly,  once the revised project had been received, the
tendering process for appointing a Procurement Agent
could commence. Notwithstanding  the above constraints,
tractors and implements were delivered in time for the
preparation of fields for winter crops.
Priuate sector deuelopment  and economic reintegration
4.54, The Commission's action in the domain has been
geared towards the economic  integration  of refugees  and
displaced persons, and has therefore complemented its
rnain sphere of intervention. The situation in Bosnia
cannot, moreover,  be compared with that elsewhere in
Central and Eastern Europe. Economic transition has
been a complement to two fundamental  cornponents ofa
_t)
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Community action, namely the physical  reconstruction of
the country following the war and the construction of a
new state in the wake of the peace agreements. It  is
therefore normal that the Comrnission should have
focused its efforts on the priorities and rnade choices in
this sphere. Economic recovery is, however, receiving
international assistance: the'V7orld Bank and USAID have
targeted  their efforts on this issue, doing far less in the
field of the return of refugees than the Commission.
There has therefore been a division of labour between
donors and good coordination, which accounts for the
Community's limited action in this sphere.
4.55. The EU Investment Guarantee Investment Trust
Fund for BiH is designed to provide political risk
insurance to companies wishing to develop their activities
within the country but who have been deterred by the
perceived risks of  changes to/by  the  national
Government.
The innovative nature of the scheme meant that the time
taken to develop the proposal into a sound project took
longer than would be the case for more straightforward
proposals.  The detailed Framework Agreement,  together
with a side letter covering  certain financial arrangements,
was signed by the Commissioner in July 1997. The
Framework  Agreement became effective as  from
September t997 following signature by the Bosnian
authorities.
A total of 9 preliminary  applications have been received
in respect of investments totalling ECU 158 rnillion in the
fields of manufacturing,  construction,  telecoms, energy
and tourism. These are currently  being assessed.
4.56. Selection of the Zica V/ire Drawing Factory was
based upon the catalytic effect that support to  the
company would bring to the reconstruction efforts within
the region. The Factory's  products are essential
components  of  the  major energy and transport
infrastructure  projects, as well as housing schemes
throughout the region. The proiect is underway  and a
number of jobs have been created.
Support for public administration
4.57. It  would have been unrealistic to embark on
massive public administration programmes  before the
basic institutions, and particular those provided for in the
Dayton Agreement, were in place. The Commission,
working closely with the OHR, has approved  support
programmes  for introduction throughout  this year.
The Commission  has provided,  and will continue to
provide, sizeable  technical  assistance to the Central
institutions. Existing measures have already made a
significant impact on Customs, the start-up of central
banking and approximation  of legislation.
5. CONCLUSION
5.1. The decision to launch a substantial  programme of
aid to the former Yugoslavia  was not accompanied at the
time by corresponding allocations  of resources for the
Comrnission to  implement the  programme.  The
Commission  has taken steps in 1,998 to improve the
situation by transferring  personnel to Saraievo and has
made proposals,  both legislative  and budgetary,  designed
to ease existing constraints. These are detailed  below.
5.3. Within one week of the Dayton  Agreement, the
Commission, together with the 
.Sforld Bank, mobilised
the international  community  through the first donor
Conference for  the reconstruction  of  Bosnia and
Herzegovina held in December 1995. The Commission
was able to decide at the end of 1995 to comrnit funds in
early 1,996 for a programme of essential aid (the EAP
programme  financed through Phare), and sent staff to
Sarajevo at the beginning of 1,996 for the purpose of
setting up and monitoring the operation. In this respect,
the Comrnission  provided a rapid response to the urgency
of the situation arising after the Dayton Agreement.
The Commission has been working in  particularly
difficult circumstances  :
-  The political situation on the ground has been
unstable, with  some parties obstructing the
application of  the peace agreements. Yet these
agreements made the approval of  the central
authorities  set up under them a precondition  for the
implementation  of  Community programmes.
Approval  was not obtained until November for 1996
and September for  1,997. The Commission was
therefore quite unable to implement its programmes
immediately.
- 
The application of the political conditions laid down
by the High Representative and the Council of
Ministers  has posed problems. Execution has, for
example,  been slowed down by the suspension  of aid
to the Republika Srpska on two occasions.
- 
Complex, constrictive legal and financial  instruments
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Commission's advice, of the procedures  and ceilings
of the TACIS programme in Regulation (EC) No
1,528196 delayed that Regulation's  adoption to the
end of July 1996. This accounts for the need, prior to
that date, to use the trialogue procedure to obtain
funds. All the Commission's  proposals  to amend  the
Regulation were systematically  corrected to make
thern more restrictive.  Not until this year did the
Parliament and the Council take on board the
criticisms  directed at atd to former Yugoslavia  and go
along with the main thrust of the Commission's
proposals to make procedures more flexible and
speed up implementation.
Despite these difficulties,  by the end of '1.995, the budget
under chapter  B7-5 4 was 99,9 7o committed. At the end
of.'1.997,  the revised budget for chapter B7-5 4 (excluding
the financial protocol line) was 99,5 "  committed.
Taking the 1,996-97 period together, the volume of
budgetary resources committed by the Commission,  in
addition to humanitarian aid, was ECU 542,2 million of
which approxirnately ECU 28.6,6 million had been
contracted and ECU 208,1 million paid. This rate of
contracting and payment contrasts  favourably  compared
with other external aid programmes  funded by the
Community budget, particularly  given the difficult
conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Commission has
also funded non-reconstruction  activities, outside the
scope of the Court's report and for which the figures are
not included above, in the fields of democracy,  human
rights and CFSP joint actions.
The Court's comparison of actions financed by the
Commission and those of other donors does not take
into account the different nature of the support provided.
For example, the 'World Bank provides its support
essentially  through loans. Managing a loan scheme differs
significantly  from a grant rdgime such as the one
provided by the Commission. Grants are provided  with
no guarantee other than the political commitrnent of the
beneficiary.  In order to protect public funds, controls on
the disbursement of grants are therefore much more
cornplex and slower than those for loans. In contrast to
this situation, loans are repayable and guaranteed by the
country concerned. Their repayments  are credited to the
balance sheet of the bank. Political conditionality is less
of  a  constraint. In  spite of  this handicap, the
disbursement performance  of grants provided by the
Commission  and the loans of the World Bank is broadly
similar. On I  January '1.998, the World Bank had
expended around ECU 260 million, compared with a
Commission total of around ECU 275 million.
As far as USAID is concerned,  a substantial component
of the assistance they provided was in the form of credit
lines to  small businesses, again with more rapid
disbursement rates. The decision-making procedures
applying to USAID are also markedly  more sirnple  than
in  the case of  the European Union, where  the
Comrnission  had to operate under a Regulation with
rnuch stricter public procurement rules. In contrast to the
United  States, which worked initially mainly where their
troops are based, European  Union aid initially comprised
both entities.
5.4. The Commission accepts the Court's criticism that
the resources  allocated to managing the reconstruction
programme in ex-Yugoslavia  were not cornmensurate
with the budgetary allocation decided at political level.
Given the other budgetary priorities managed by the
Departments  concerned  (Assistance to  Central and
Eastern Europe, the pre-accession  strategy, the Newly
Independent  States, CFSP, Democracy  and Human
Rights, Humanitarian Aid) there are lirnits to what can
be achieved by redeployment of existing resources.
Given the constraints on creating new posts, the
Commission  has nevertheless  redeployed staff to reinforce
the teams managing  this assistance.  These measures  have
had the following results:
- 
A 22-member team was set up at Sarajevo office in
late 1,996, sorne seven months after its opening. It
comprises  4 A  grades (including  the head of the
office),  1 B grade, 1 C grade and 16 local staff, seven
of them expatriates.
The Commission  then seconded  an A-grade official to
the administration in Mostar (EUAM) to close the
accounts for the EU's activities (ECU 200 million)
and assigned another A-grade official to the OHR.
-  In  1,996 a  new unit, DG IA-D-1, 'Bosnia and
Herzegovina and  reconstruction,  including
international coordination, horizontal aspects,
multi-country programmes for former Yugoslavia'
was set up in Brussels. At the end of 1997 this unit
had a staff of 21, two-thirds of them assigned to
former Yugoslavia.
As far as external technical expertise is concerned,  "1,998
is the first budgetary year f.or which the Cornmission is
authorised to  use operational credits for  technicala
l
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These measures will be completed
3.13-3.15: decentralising  the
Community assistance  to Bosnia,
of the Delegation  and transferring
from April this year.
by those described in
implementation of
increasing the powers
staff to the Delegation
support for prograrnme implementation, to a maximum
of 2-3.5 o/" of programme  costs. This contrasts with other
donors such as USAID who may go above 15 % for
similar fypes of expenditure.
coordination  meetings, both in Brussels  and in the field,
and led to the development of close links between  the
relevant departments  in the Member Stares.
In  1998 the  Commission has concentrated its
reconstruction efforts on a major refugee programme
worth ECU 1,41, million. A first tranche of ECU 65
million, for integrated refugee return programmes, was
committed on 30 March 1,998. Other packages will
follow as soon as the Budgetary  Authority lifts the ECU
30 million reserve in the 1998 Budget.
5.6. The essential aid programme (EAP), drawn up
straight after the Dayton Agreement and introduced  in
January  1996, has provided  assistance  crucial to getting
reconstruction under way. The programme  has permitted
the provision of equipment for schools,  buses, tractors,
agricultural inputs, equipment for the electricity sector
etc. This programme  was the first major response from a
member  of the international  community  to the problems
of reconstruction.
The  Commission  refocused the  equipment-supply
programme for several reasons. It became aware of the
difficult environment in which it  was operaring: the
substantial risk of fraud, denounced  at the time by the
High Representative, the lack of transparency in the
management of aid and the risk that aid might not reach
its  intended recipients forced the Commission  to
centralise  the programmes.  At the time the political
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina  rneant there was little
point decentralising  the programme to the country's
authorities. In taking this decision,  the Commission  was
defending the Community's financial interests, The
programme has been refocused on fewer sectors.
As regards procedures, the 1996 budget, published  on 29
January 1,996, includes  three headings specifically  for
assistance to forrner Yugoslavia.  Pending a legal basis, the
Cornmission  was authorised  to use ECU 7 million of the
appropriation for heading B7-S 41, the remaining  ECU
20 million being held in reserve. The use of the ECU 20
million was subsequently authorised  in the framework  of
the trialogue. In April 1995 the Commission  presented a
draft Regulation for the Reconstruction headings; it did
not enter into force until 14 August 1996.In the course
of  discussions, the Cornmission proposal underwent
major amendments, notably the addition of an annex on
Coordination between the Commission's departments
described 3.1L.-3.I2. above.
5.5. In autumn 1995 the Commission  published four
communications  announcing  a comprehensive  strategy.
This strategy is  taken up  in  the reconstruction
programme  drawn up by the Commission  and the'Vflorld
Bank. They submitted the programrne to different donors
at three international conferences, obtaining the approval
of  the  international cornmunity. Each year the
Commission draws up guidelines for the strategy's
implementation. These guidelines are then translated  into
sectoral programmes comprising a series of integrated
projects, notably for  refugees. The Memoranda of
Understanding  signed with the Bosnian authorities for the
1995 and 1997 programmes  also provide an overall
framework for  the  implementation of  those
programmes.
At the London Conference  of December 1996, the
Commission took  the  initiative ro  set up  the
'Reconstruction and Return Task Force' (RRTF) which,
under the aegis and presidency of the OHR, coordinates
reconstruction activities aimed at promoting  return. Since
1.997 the RRTF has brought together  all major players in
international assistance, arnong them the UNHCR, the '!ilorld Bank, the United States and the Commission,
laying down in its six-monthly reports the international
community's  policy on support for  the return of
displaced persons and refugees.
In 1997 the Commission also proposed a 'Deputy High
Representative' with special responsibility for the RRTF,
Mr Andrew Bearpark. The RRTF has also set up regional
and local branches, which, with the Commission's  active
involvement, establish priorities for each region and
municipality.
In the rnatter of cooperation  with the Member States, the
Commission, in 1996, initiated close cooperation  with
the Member States most directly concerned by the return
of refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina,  organising a meeting
on the subject in Brussels on 7 August 1996. This
cooperation has since given rise to  a  series of.l
a
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the award of contracts based on the TACIS Regulation
and wholly unsuited to the situation in Bosnia. In July
tgg7, i. e. the earliest date at which the Regulation  could
be amended, the Cornmission subrnitted an amendment
to  that annex. The Council retained the original
arrangements and accepted few of the Commission's
proposals.  The Comrnission  submitted another proposal
substantially  amending the Regulation  in January this
year. This time the Council and Parliament  took on
board the rnajor criticisms of Community  action in
former Yugoslavia  and went along with the broad thrust
of the Commission  proposal.
5.7. The mandate  of UNHCR in relation to refugees is
defined in the Dayton Agreement to lead and coordinate
action in this field. The Commission  is therefore obliged
to work with UNHCR in this context.  Considerable
problerns  were encountered  during discussions with the
UNHCR on the EC contribution to housing projects
implemented by NGOs, through the UNHCR. The
conditions  under which the UNHCR wished to receive
EC contributions  were, in some aspects' contrary to the
requirements  of the Financial Regulation and lacking in
transparency.  The Court's idea of a global contribution
to  UNHCR's funds therefore needs more careful
consideration. The Commission intends to examine this
question in light of the general conditions concerning
financial arrangements with the UN currently under
discussion.
5.8. Through the Essential Aid Programme in 1'996 and
the reconstruction  prograrnme in 1.996 and 1'997, the
Commission  has repaired  a total of 13 030 housing  units
allowing the return by the end of the programrne  period
of more than 50 000 persons (refugees and internally
displaced) in Bosnia.
As far as the occupancy rates of houses is concerned,  at
the end of 1,997 this was 70 % for Commission funded
programmes, slightly above the average for the other
donors.
In L998, the Comrnission is reinforcing its action on
return by the measures  described in 5.5.
5.9. There have been some successes in the energy sector
of the EAP programme l
- 
A successful inter-entity project between Gorazde and
Visegrad  has been carried out though the EAP.
-  In the Tuzla region, electrical distribution has been
secured to 20 000 people.
thermal power plants have increased production and
power cuts in  Sarajevo have been reduced
significantly,
- 
the supply of equipment to the mine of Breza has
helped increase coal production by 30 %.
In the transport sector a number of road projects have
been delayed by the suspension of aid to Republika
Srpska for political reasons.
Help for public administration  has been targeted on the
Customs office, of considerable importance for public
revenues of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other key institutions
which are receiving  support in 1'998 include: Central
Bank, Ombudsman, Human Rights Commission, the
Constitutional  Court and the commercial banking
sector,
In the health and education  sectors, the constraints  on
DG IA  are more a reflection of the relevant local
authorities'  inability to accept the assistance offered them
(cf. Laboratory for Quality Control) than any lack of
coordination between Commission departments.
Likewise, in the education sector, the lack of a political
will to harmonise  curricula continues to hamper the
re-establishment  of multi-ethnic schools.
5.10. The Commission accepts that the resources
devoted to rnanaging assistance for former Yugoslavia
were not commensurate with the political decision  to
provide extra budgetary resources. Measures to redeploy
staff were taken and are detailed in 5.4.
The  activities of  Commission  departments were
coordinated  by an interdepartmental working party
chaired by the Deputy Director-General of  DG IA.
ECHO, DG XXI (for CAFAO) and other departments
were involved throughout  this exercise.
This forrnal coordination was backed up by numerous
informal and operational contacts between departments.
5.11. At  the  beginning of  the  reconstruction
prograrnmes  in  "1.996, assistance was spread over a
number of key sectors in order to provide a response to
the emergency situation of the time. Later in  1,996,
support was concentrated on a more limited number of
sectors. In  1998, the  Commission's programmes
concentrated over 60 % of all resources for the former
Yugoslavia  on a single priority, namely  the refugee return
programme.
5.1,2. The Commission accepts the Court's criticisrns
concerning staff resources, complex  procedures  and the
visibility of EU assistance  in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The constraints under which the Commission  had to
operate have been described in the preamble to the
Court's report as well as in points 5.3. and 5.5.{
f
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The Commission decided early in 1998 to respond to
these difficulties  by taking the following measures:
sirnplifying  procedures by
reconstruction Regulation
modifying  the
transferring an additional 15 staff to its Delegation  in
Sarajevo from Spring 1998
giving the Head of Delegation in Sarajevo additional
powefs
- 
bringing together all Commission services in one
building in Sarajevo.
The Commission  is willing to propose additional changes
to  the Regulation  in  order to  simplify procedures
further.
Taken together, and with the support of the budgetary
and legislative authorities of the EU, these measures
should help deliver a  more visible and effective
implementation of EU assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina.